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ABSTRACT
NORM CONTESTATION AND ITS EFFECTS ON EMERGENCE OF A NEW NORM
Khadijeh Salimi
Old Dominion University, 2021
Director: Dr. Jesse Richman

The objective of this study is to propose a theoretical model to investigate the mechanism
by which contesting of a harmful legal norm by powerless individual actors results in the
emergence of a new norm. While much work has been done on norm contestation at the “actor
level” in the field, the structural conditions under which contesting of harmful norms by
powerless individual actors lead to emergence of a new norm have been insufficiently studied,
especially in the non-democratic cultural context. I developed a model that combine existing
causal theories in one frame to reproduce observe conditions in the real world to determine
necessary structural conditions for the emergence of a new norm by powerless individual actors.
A modeling and simulation method and, more specifically, the theoretical model building
paradigm is used to develop the model. Social identity theory and the system dynamics modeling
approach are used to respectively build the conceptual model and implement the simulation
model. The model is tested and compared within two types of communities: democratic and
loose vs non-democratic and tight.
My findings determine necessary structural conditions for the emergence of a new norm.
Indeed, my model’s result show that education among others play the main role in the process of
norm emergence which is consistent with the previous literature. Moreover, the model’s results
demonstrate that while average-strength harmful norms can be replaced in democratic and loose
societies, only weak norms can be replaced in non-democratic and tight societies. Finally, the

simulation model introduces new counterfactual generated hypothesis that can be further tested
through empirical studies.
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INTRODUCTION

“One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one
has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.”
Martin Luther King Letter from the Birmingham Jail, 16 April 1963
Many Afghans flee to Russia with the hope of building a better life and to make their
dreams come true. Fahima and her family are among many refugees who dream of attending
university in Russia and becoming doctors in order to serve others. However, when she and her
husband were settled in Russia, they learned that refugees are prohibited from attending
university by law. Thus, she found all her dreams shattered and she had to stay home as a
housewife. Although some might think that this law is beneficial as it saves educational and job
opportunities for Russian citizens, others would perceive the law as discriminatory. One of the
very clear advantages, alongside others, of allowing refugees to go to university became obvious
during this current pandemic. People like Fahima could be a significant help to society. This is
just an example; there are many other cases of restrictive and harmful norms enforced by
governments across the world. These consist of discriminatory norms against religious, ethnic,
and gender minorities. Such norms need to be challenged and, ideally, changed. While
governments are not willing to change those laws and most other countries follow a nonintervention foreign policy, it is mainly up to a country’s residents to contest and challenge these
laws. But this process of norm contestation has been insufficiently studied in the field. As a
result, this study proposes a theoretical model which provides one potential explanation about the
mechanisms under which contestation of a harmful norm by powerless individual actors results
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in the emergence of a new norm. It will be useful to define norm and contestation as two key
words before proceeding to the next section.
Wiener defined contestation as a “social practice [that] entails objection to specific issues
that matter to people;” in “international relations, contestation ... involves the range of social
practices which discursively express disapproval of norms.”1 In this case people are potentially
contesting what they perceive to be a harmful norm. Thus, it is appropriate to define norm as
well. Scholars define a norm as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actor/actors with a given
identity (Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995).
Research Background
Because norms are studied across disciplines and with varying perspectives, each field
studies the part of norms which are of particular interest for their discipline. As a result, there
exist several types of norms and it is necessary to differentiate them. We can define three major
types of norms at different levels: individual/private, social, and legal. The moral norm is a norm
that can find a place on any major types of norms, based on the situation and culture of the
society (Harms & Skyrms, 2008). An example is a norm that prohibits abusing children which
could be a legal norm in some societies and an individual norm in others. Thus, we do not study
it separately. Individual or private norms are mostly value driven. Values are abstract general
standards (Dechesne, Dignum, & Tan, 2011). They are linked to concrete behavior by norms. In
other words, norms are tools to fulfill the goal/value (Vickers, 1973). Integrity and feelings of
guilt are the main motives for obedience (Dechesne et al., 2011). Usually, people are willing to
promote their values, especially when there is a problem that is not compatible with their values.
As a result, they define individual/private norms as a tool and as an appropriate behavior to solve
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the problem, gain something beneficial, or avoid something bad, and to reach the value (Vickers,
1973). Individuals act and promote their values and if a considerable number of others observe
the norm, then the individual norm has the potential to become a group norm and maybe later a
social norm. However, when it comes to a group/social norm or legal norm, we are talking about
shared values rather than personal values. Thus, group members follow group norms to achieve
the groups’ interests and values. It should be noted that both legal and group norms are shared,
but they have some major differences. While the legal norm is a top-down phenomenon and
usually power related, the group/social norm emerges through individual interaction and is a
bottom-up phenomenon. Table 1. summarizes all three types of norms.

Table 1. Different Types of Norms
Type of Norms

Individual/Private

Group/Social Norm

Legal Norm

Norm
Description

Norm that agents develop
privately over their lives

Norm that emerges among
people

Norm that is imposed by the
central authority on the
community

Fields’ Point of
View

Implicit and value driven

Interactionist view
(bottom-up)

Legalistic view (top-down)

Enforcing
Mechanism

Feeling of guilt/ lower
self-esteem

Peer-pressure/exclusion

Physical sanction

No matter the type of norm, punishment is used as an enforcement tool. There exist three
main punishment mechanisms in the literature: emotion-based punishment, punishment based on
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reputation, and physical sanctioning which usually applies to individual, group, and legal norms.
In what follows, I explain each with more detail:
I.

Sanctioning through Emotion approach: Scholars believe that emotions lead to norm
enforcement. An emotional agent may be abandoned by society if others don’t like it.
Because of this, they may experience shame or guilt as a result of norm deviation. In other
words, in this approach violators are punished through their emotions.

II.

Sanctioning through Reputation approach: This approach is based on the opinions of other
members of a group or society toward agents. That opinion might be positive or negative
based on the way an agent chooses to behave. In this approach, agents comply with most
of their groups’ members to maximize their utility by safeguarding their positive
reputation.

III.

Sanctioning through punishment approach: The most common form of norm enforcement
is punishment. One of the most famous works in this area is Axelrod (1986). Using a game
theory approach, he shows how punishing violating agents is essential in the process of
norm enforcement. Punishment in this approach could be physical or could include
monetary sanctions.

Table 2. provides a brief summary of sanctioning mechanisms.
As discussed, sanctioning is the main mechanism used to enforce a norm and, as a result, target
populations will follow a norm to avoid punishment. Norm-oriented constructivists traditionally
assumed that violation of a norm results in punishment. This approach to the study of norms
mostly ignores the subjective role of norm takers and considers no agency for norm takers to
violate the norm. However, later, a group of scholars made a shift in norm study and began
considering an active role for norm adopters. Based on this approach, norm takers think about
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the norm; they understand and interpret norms differently, and thus norms are not linear
(Acharya, 2004) (Acharya, 2013). The current wave of constructivist norm-study scholars claims
that norm takers, in unique situations, can contest the dominant norm. For example, China
recently did this with the European Union’s norm of assistance during humanitarian crises. They
modified it to reflect what the United Kingdom and the United States did after WWII, when it
was the norm to plunder (Sandholtz, 2008). Along with advancement in norm contestation
theories at the international level, scholars also pay attention to changing norms through
contestation at the domestic level. Sikkink (2013) investigated the role of the Bush
administration in changing a norm of torture during the conflict between the United States and
Iraq (Heller, Kahl, & Pisoiu, 2012) that was focused on norms of counter terrorism.

Table 2. Norms Enforcement Mechanisms
Mechanism

Punishment

Emotion

Characteristic

Reference

Utility maximization,

Axelrod (1986); (y López, Luck, &

monetary sanctions

d'Inverno, 2002)

Negative and positive feelings such as:

von Scheve, Moldt, Fix, and von Luede

satisfaction,

(2006) ;(Keltner & Haidt, 1999)

pride,

contentment;

shame, guilt, embarrassment

Reputation

Positive or negative opinion about a

Hales (2002); (Castelfranchi, Dignum,

person, peer pressure, exclusion

Jonker, & Treur, 1999)

However, the contesting literature only emphasizes and investigates the role of
powerful actors. But what about powerless ones? For a long time, this question had no answer,
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but Wunderlich’s study shows that powerless norm contesters can challenge the existing norm
and define their own norm (Wunderlich, 2020). That study caused a significant shift in the
field by introducing the idea that state level norm breaker actors can potentially be norm
promoters at the international level. In contrast with the dominant perception in the field,
contestation is not always considered unacceptable. That study supports the findings of other
scholars that a contester’s level of power is not the only determining factor, and under suitable
structural conditions, even powerless actors can change a norm. What I investigate in this
research is:
Under which conditions do powerless individual actors’ contestation of harmful dominant
norms cause the emergence of new norms which result in changes in states’ behavior.
To answer the research question, I propose a theoretical model to explore the mechanisms
under which norm contestation by powerless actors causes the emergence of a new norm at the
domestic level. Theoretical modeling is one specific paradigm of Modeling and Simulation. This
paradigm is a multi-step process composed of building a conceptual model, a causal loop, and a
simulation model and, finally, analyzing the result to generate a new theory and new insights that
contribute to the field.
To build the conceptual model, I use social identity theory. I consider a reverse causality
by assuming first, if contestation happens at the appropriate time, it results in positive feelings at
least among a part of society. Next, I look at punishment as a potential facilitator of increasing
violation versus merely serving as the main tool of enforcing a norm. By answering this
question, I aim to provide one potential explanation and interpretation of the mechanism under
which theoretical norm contestation results in norm emergence. From a theoretical standpoint,
this will contribute to the constructivists’ norm contestation theories and from a methodological
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standpoint, it offers a cause of behavior where the field mostly studies phenomenon from an
individual perspective.
Chapter Overview
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on norm study in international relations. To do
so, I divide the existing literature into two separate parts: first waves of norm study, which are
divided into three categories; conformance to a norm, spreading of a norm, and emergence of a
norm, and their applications in several sub-fields like political economy, security, human rights,
democratization, environmental issues, and energy study. At the end of this section, I discuss
three major critiques toward the first wave of norm-oriented constructivists which shifted the
field into the second wave. In the next section, I discuss the second wave of norm study which
contains two main groups: compliance and contestation. In this part, with an emphasis on the
current literature on contestation, I bring up a question in the area which this study intends to
address. Finally, in the last section, I discuss this study’s contributions to the field.
Chapter 3 provides a detailed explanation of the research method. This chapter begins
with a broad overview of the potential value of a modeling and simulation approach, and then
discusses one specific modeling and simulation paradigm used to address that question—the
theory building paradigm. This paradigm is a multi-step process which begins by constructing
dynamic hypotheses or a conceptual model regarding the research question. Causal loop
diagrams are then used to depict the conceptual model and to build a simulation model. After
building a simulation model and having it validated, there is a need to determine a combination
of parameter values to answer the research question. The answers the model provides will
contribute to and expand the literature on norms.
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Chapter 4 describes social identity theory which is the foundation for the conceptual
model. In this chapter, I build the conceptual model or dynamic hypothesis which is composed of
42 claims and assumptions. After that step, as in Chapter 3, the causal loop diagrams are used to
depict the logical relationships between norm emergence variables. For the purpose of both
clarity and structural verification I explain each loop separately: in total there were 12 balancing
(B)loops and 17 reinforcing (R) loops. Through this qualitative model two new contributions to
knowledge emerged; first, government punishment of violators causes angriness which increases
risk taking and more violating actions. Second, angriness due to governments’ punishment
resulted in more group behavior and as a result increased the number of new norm followers
which, in turn, influenced other non-group members to adopt similar perceptions. Thus,
punishment might, depending upon the magnitude of these effects, play the role of an accelerator
in those cases rather than a prohibitor.
Chapter 5 turns a qualitative model into a computational model. Although the qualitative
model provides us valuable insight regarding the research questions, to get deeper insight and
more details I need to construct a simulation model. The system dynamics modeling approach is
used to implement the conceptual model which is built in Vensim. To explain the simulation
model, I combine guidelines for simulation-based models in social science (Rahmandad &
Sterman, 2012) with examples from the literature (Pierson & Sterman, 2013). The model I
construct consists of five sub-models: “Perception of Similarity,” “Perception of Dissimilarity,”
“New Norm Internalization,” “Emergence of New Norm,” and “Exit.” While explaining each
sub-model, I discuss all variables and parameters in detail including their description, their units,
and respective equations for both clarity and reproducibility. At the end of this chapter, I test the
model structure and behavior to ensure confidence in the model and its results. To test the
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model’s structure, I use the structure-verification test, dimensional-consistency test, and
boundary-adequacy test. For the model’s behavior test, I apply the behavior-reproduction test,
extreme condition test, and sensitivity test.
Chapter 6 examines a series of experiments that build from a baseline model with
assumptions intended to model an emergence of a contesting norm in both democratic and nondemocratic cultures. To analyse the results of each experiment, I use a path dependence
approach. In this chapter, I provide answers to this study’s main question and explain the
mechanisms under which a new norm might emerge in both democratic and non-democratic
cultures. I examine the consequences of study assumptions regarding anger as a response to
attempted suppression of deviations from the norm. Then, I investigate the impact of showing
extreme behavior during collective actions and its consequances. After that, I test the importance
of norm-antipreneurs to promote the old norm and keep the status quo in this dynamic process of
transferring from old norm to a new norm. Finally, I study whether contestation of an old norm
results in different or similar results when there exists less pressure and punishment.
Chapter 7 concludes this research by summarizing the answer to the main research
question which comes from the new theory/model developed through this study. That answer
contributes theoretically to the constructivists’ contestation theory by advancing our
understanding of the mechanisms and dynamic processes by which powerless actors’
contestation within a community causes the emergence of new norms that affect state behavior.
Although this study has a very important and unique contribution to the field, it has its own
limitations. The simulation model can be improved in some ways which I explain in this chapter.
Indeed, most of the initial values are a scientific guess, so the study would benefit from a
collection of real-world data to optimize the model in the context of specific applied cases.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
Norms and norm emergence have long been of interest across disciplines from sociology
to psychology to communications to international relations (IR). This chapter reviews the
existing literature on norm study in IR. I first discuss how norm study found its way into the field
through constructivist scholars and became accepted as an important school of thought in IR.
Then, to explain the existing literature, I divide it into two separate parts. The first part consists
of the first wave of norm study which is subdivided into three categories: conformance to a
norm, spreading of a norm, and emergence of a norm. I also outline their applications in several
sub-fields like political economy, security, human rights, democratization, environmental issues,
and energy studies. At the end of this section, I discuss three major critiques toward the first
wave of norm-oriented constructivists which inspired a group of scholars in the field to shift into
the second wave. In the next section, I discuss the second wave of norm study which contains
two main groups: compliance and contestation. In this part, with the emphasize on the current
literature on contestation, I bring up an open question in the area which this study will address.
Finally, in the last section, I discuss this study’s contributions to the field and end the chapter
with concluding remarks.
Norm Study in IR
The study of norms has not been a traditional aspect of IR, which is primarily focused on
material and rational arguments about the interaction of states in world politics. Neorealists
believe that the anarchic system of the world caused insecurity and distrust among states (as the
main actors) and made them seek more of a portion of relative power or security (materialistic).
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In other words, realists and, more specifically, neorealists mostly see the structure of the
international system as the distribution of material. On the other hand, Neoliberalism as another
critical school of thought in IR focuses on the distribution of capabilities and institutions; they
see new actors such as international institutions and trade organizations as cooperation
coordinators. However, in the 1980s, constructivists started to challenge the dominant schools of
thought by suggesting the importance of normative structure in IR. Thus, norm study in
international relations is principally a study offered by constructivism, which has its roots in
sociology.2 By proposing this new approach to study IR, constructivists challenged the dominant
countervailing approaches. Scholars such as Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), Onuf (1989), Ruggie
(1993), and Wendt (1987, 1992) are among the early constructivists who established new
approaches in IR. Some of the new approaches noted in their work are:
1. Important aspects of politics are socially constructed vs. being fixed
2. Intersubjective reality vs. objective subjective reality
3. Ideational structure, based on identity, vs. materialist structure
4. Commitment to mutual constitution of the agent-structure problem
These features enabled constructivists to address one of the most important questions in
IR differently: what runs the international system? Recall that in the realist school of thought,
anarchy is fundamental in the international system, which causes uncertainty among states.
Realists believe that the anarchic system of the world causes insecurity and distrust among states
(as the main actors) and makes them seek a larger portion of relative power or security

2

Classic sociology considers a norm as a behavioral pattern which is imposed by structure/society (macro-level) to
individuals (micro-level) to make sure that the entire structure works appropriately (Durkheim, E. (1964(1982)). "The
Rules of Sociological Method by Emile Durkheim Edited with an Introduction by Steven Lukes Translated-by WD
Halls." From provided reading material: Social constructivism (From: https://en. wikipedia.
org/wiki/Social_constructivism# Social_constructivism_and_social_constructionism) Introduction and. Se1ection C.
; Spencer, 1897; Parsons, 1937).
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(materialistic). However, Wendt (1999) argues with Waltz in that he ignores the role of
individual identity and intersubjective shared understanding (norm) in the shaping of initial
behavior and identity of states in world politics. For Wendt, states are self-organized units that
have an initial identity. These states can redefine and reconstruct their identity through social
interaction in the system. This constructivist feature enables constructivists to study how a state,
as an agent or actor, might change its norms and behavior as a result of interaction with other
states. Early constructivists primarily studied norms through this lens.
Initial Wave of Norm-Oriented Constructivists
After establishing a new approach in IR, a group of constructivists shifted their attention
to norm study; they are called norm-oriented constructivists. Defining norms was a matter of
controversy for a while. However, consensus rose among scholars that a norm is “a standard of
appropriate behavior for actor/actors with a given identity” (Finnemore, 1996; Katzenstein, 1996;
Klotz, 1999). So far, there exist two main waves of norm study in this school of thought. The initial
wave of norm-oriented constructivists’ studies can be classified into three main categories:
Conformance (Normative Behavior), Spreading (Socialization), and Emergence (Normative
Emergence).
Conformance (Normative Behavior)
This group mainly studied how an existing norm affects behavior inside the community
and how it stabilizes expectations in the community. Scholars in this area proved, in contrast
with what scholars previously believed, that norms mattered and that there is a conformance to
the norm (Yee, 1996). In other words, community behavior was bound around existing norms
and, in the case of new norms, behavior would build around emerging norms. Conformance
norm scholars mostly study norms from a structural perspective. Norms are independent

13
variables; they constitute actors’ interests and their understanding of the material worlds. Indeed,
they make political behavior possible or constrain it. Scholars like Barkin and Cronin (1994),
Finnemore (1996), Finnemore (2003), (Katzenstein, 1996), Klotz (1999), Legro (1996), Price
(1997), and Tannenwald (1999) are among those who worked in this area.
Spreading (Socialization)
Another group of constructivists study how a norm diffuses through socialization.
“Socialization is aimed at creating membership in a society where the intersubjective
understanding of the society becomes taken for granted” (Johnston, 2001). The goal of this group
is to study how a given norm in the community is diffused to actors outside the community
(Checkel, 2001; Johnston, 2001; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1994; Risse-Kappen,
Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). This group focused on the mechanism through which a single
established norm diffuses, such as coercion, competition, emulation, and learning.
Emergence (Normative Emergence)
This group investigated how an idea became a norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998;
Nadelmann, 1990) and why some ideas successfully achieve normative status while others do not
(Cortell & Davis Jr, 1996, 2000; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Legro, 2000; Payne, 2001) There
is huge overlap with the socialization literature here regarding the mechanism by which an idea
becomes a norm and how norms spread (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Scholars offered several
different driving factors for norm emergence such as hegemony, leadership and non-leadership
entrepreneurial endeavors, international organizations, and activists (Finnemore & Sikkink,
1998; Ikenberry & Kupchan, 1990; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Legro, 1996). Finnemore and
Sikkink (1998) proposed one of the most dominant works in this area, which is known as “norm
life cycle,” which served as the keystone of many later studies.

14

What Is a Norm Life Cycle?
A norm life cycle consists of three steps: norm emergence, norm cascade, and
internalization (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Norm emergence is the initial stage in which norm
entrepreneurs find a problem in the dominant norm, try to call attention to the problem, and later
replace it with the new norm which is more beneficial for the society. Norm entrepreneurs could
be leaders, Non-Governmental Organizations, International Organizations, and civil society
which aim to change states’ behavior. This entrepreneur plays a crucial role in creating and
spreading the norm. Between stages one and two, there is a tipping point such that norm
adaptation becomes increasingly fast or, in other words, a norm cascade. At the final stage, when
many actors accept the norm and internalize it, the norm is taken for granted and it shapes
behavior. This idea was furthered developed by Moskovko (2012), to include conceptualizing
more specifically the tipping point beyond which norms tend to be adopted by all members of
society. Figure 1. depicts the resulting norm life cycle. I loosely borrow this image from
Moskovko (2012).

Figure 1. Norm Life Cycle
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Application of Norm Study in IR
This initial wave of theoretical norm study was followed by other scholars who
conducted several important empirical studies applying norms in different areas that were
previously ignored in IR like human rights, development, security, and some other sub-fields.
Constructivist scholars initially were focused on efforts to advance this field theoretically, to
ground those theories, and to strengthen the constructivist claim in the field. Later, a significant
number of empirical studies were conducted. In what follows, I provide the main empirical
studies in the field.
Political Economy
Political economy is one of the fields that has been of interest for norm study scholars.
There exist several studies to determine why some monetary norms do or do not diffuse in the
international system and what main mechanism for diffusion is (Elkins, Guzman, & Simmons,
2006; Henisz, Zelner, & Guillén, 2005; Simmons & Elkins, 2004).
In this area, Simmons and Elkins (2004) study the diffusion of the liberal economic norm
in the international system. The authors mostly focus on attempting to find out why many
political economy models have not captured the effect of the important liberal economic norm
sufficiently since it has a huge impact on the life of millions of people. The results of their study
show that states’ foreign policy is significantly influenced by their international peers, activity
around monetary policy. In other words, governments, through their social interactions, try to
compete or simply just emulate their peers. This study belongs to the first wave of norm study
and can be classified as part of the conformance group.
Elkins et al. (2006) similarly study why diffusion of bilateral investment treaties (BIT)—
which are among the most important international legal mechanisms for encouraging
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governments to engage in foreign direct investment—has become so common in the last decade.
The evidence from their empirical study proves that coercion, competition, and learning play
important roles but that emulation does not.
Conflict and Security
Work involving norms in this area mainly study how norm emergence and spreading
affect the field of security. Areas like war, prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction,
and terrorism are among the most widely studied areas.
Tannenwald (1999) tries to address why WWII was the only time during modern warfare
that a nuclear weapon has been used and why the prohibition of nuclear weapons after WWII
became one the most important issues in IR. He believes, in contrast to the widely accepted
belief, that deterrence cannot provide a complete explanation and the normative structure plays a
major role in explaining why nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. He analyzes four
historical cases: the United States’ decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan (1945), the
Korean War (1950-53), the Vietnam War (1960s), and the Persian Gulf War (1991). In this
empirical study he puts emphasis on the deterrence theory explanation’s anomalies. For example,
in the Persian Gulf War and the Vietnam War, the United States opposed the absolute power of
the Soviet Union and there was no fear of retaliation, but the United States did not use it. Indeed,
deterrence cannot explain why a non-nuclear state would attack a nuclear state. This occurred
when China attacked United States forces in the Korean war and when Iraq attacked United
States and Israeli forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. He also argues that if deterrence matters,
it doesn’t follow that there are many states that have not yet developed nuclear weapons. As a
result, the notion of using nuclear weapons as normative stigma should be considered in this
prohibition or that, without it, there would be more use of nuclear weaponry. Thus, conformance
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to the norm of the prohibition of using nuclear weapons is necessary for this explanation. In
another study, Price (1997) explains how the moral stigma of using chemical weapons in war
results in the conformance of states during the war. In the realm of human rights, Klotz (1999)
explains how the United States and the United Kingdom acted to condemn apartheid and to
encourage the global community to conform to that norm which resulted in the anti-apartheid
movement.
Democratization Study
One of the other areas that norm study scholars show interest in is democratization. They
ask themselves whether democratic norms emerge in post-soviet countries. If democratic norms
of the European Union have been spread among those countries, what are the important factors
in this process? Moskovko (2012) studies the spread of democratization and European laws in
two eastern countries: Georgia and Ukraine. He uses the norm life cycle theory (Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998) to address the dynamics behind the successful (as in the case of Georgia) or the
lags in (current situation in Ukraine) norm diffusion. The results of his study show that
geographical distance does not play a significant role in this process but ruling class elites’
decision making does. This reinforces the portion of norm life cycle theory in which Finnemore
and Sikkink (1998) discussed how it is important to convince elites to be engaged.
On the other hand, scholars such as Starr (1991) around a similar question about what
causes the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe, concludes that norm diffusion happens with
the democratic norm because of the international system, regional system, and the effects of
neighboring states. Other empirical studies examine what effect the political norm change since
the end of World War II has had on states. The results prove the importance of external
conditions, like the geography of a country, in moving to democracy or autocracy. For this group
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of studies, the international system and state environment play a major role. Thus, it seems that
both the international system and state social interaction with the domestic situation affect elite
decision making (O'loughlin et al., 1998). Similarly, Gleditsch and Ward (2006) argue that the
spread of democratic norms is due to forces outside the country and because of changes in the
relative power of important actors or groups. Brinks and Coppedge (2006) also find that the main
factors in democracy diffusion are states’ emulation of their neighbors.
Human Rights
One example of empirical study in this area is a famous body of work by Risse-Kappen et
al. (1999), which influenced many subsequent studies. The authors’ main attempt in this book is
to study how human rights norms have influenced or changed the behavior of several countries
including Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, Philippines, Chile,
Guatemala, and Eastern Europe. These countries represent five distinct regions of the globe:
Northern Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. The
results of this study prove actors such as transnational activists, international organizations, and
powerful western states as well as mechanisms like persuasion, sanction, coalition building, and
domestic institutions are very important to socializing an offensive state toward a new norm.
Similarly, Keck and Sikkink (1998) study the factors that affect and change states’ and
international organizations’ behavior. They emphasize the importance of transnational activists
and international campaigns that were mainly ignored in political science. In contrast to
prevailing theories in the field, those activists and campaigns, which the authors called
“advocacy networks,” act due to their value system and not based on material interests. The
authors took historical cases in the realm of human rights like foot-binding in China, women’s
situation in Africa, and environmental issues. They conclude that transnational activities play an
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important and inevitable role in persuading states and international organizations toward new
norms.
Other scholars explore the enforcement of international humanitarian norms in Latin
American countries. Lutz and Sikkink consider three different norms: prohibition of torture in
Uruguay and Paraguay, prohibition of disappearances in Argentina and Honduras, and the right
for democratic governance. The study shows that the human rights norm has been enforced, in
all three cases, through various legal and political mechanisms (Lutz & Sikkink, 2000).
The labor rights norm and its diffusion are also of interest to researchers. Scholars tried to
evaluate the progress of labor rights in developing countries through cross-national methods. The
results show that labor rights in the exporting countries will promote labor rights in importing
countries. (Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash, 2009). In another study, Greenhill (2010) made a
cross-national analysis to find out the role of international organizations in the spread of labor
rights norms. The results show a significant direct correlation between these two factors.
Environmental Issues
Haas (1992) was mainly interested in how a norm of protecting the ozone layer emerged.
In other words, he wanted to know why countries with different political, social, and cultural
backgrounds supported the Montreal protocol. The study suggests that an entrepreneurial
leadership approach made it possible. The United States, Canada, Finland, Norway, and Sweden
were the first countries that supported this protocol and they encouraged other countries to join
the protocol; subsequently, the norm of protecting the ozone layer emerged.
Energy Study
In her studies Alizada (2017, 2018) examines the four main diffusion mechanisms to find
out which ones play an important role in spreading two renewable energy norms: feed-in tariffs
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(FIT) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS). The study findings prove that emulation is the
most important mechanism in the diffusion of FIT and RPS. In addition, both learning and
suasion mechanisms were supported by the studies’ results, while there was no support for a
competition mechanism.
Taken together these bodies of empirical literature strengthen the position of the first
wave of norm study in constructivism. However, critics of this initial wave emphasized that
considering norms as static and relatively constant is a simplification in norm dynamics. In other
words, one of the constructivists’ main claims is that norms shape and reshape through the
dynamic interplay of agents and structure. This claim should lead constructivists to consider a
norm as an entity that is dependent on the community of actors who believe in and practice that
norm. It also enabled constructivists to consider norms as dynamic which might strengthen,
weaken, or evolve through agent-structure interaction. But scholars in the first wave ignore that
dynamic interplay and consider norms static entities. They emphasize conversion and neglect
compliance and/or contestation.
Secondly, this way of studying norm diffusion was a successful linear progress which
means there is not a real agency for targets of socialization, and they cannot violate the dominant
norm. This neglected the dynamic of compliance and potential contestation of the dominant
norm. Any example of norm violation disproves constructivists’ claims. Other factors, such as
material or rational ones, must be considered (Shannon, 2000). Most of their work focuses on the
conversion compared to contestation (Nadelmann, 1990).
Finally, this wave focused on the study of norms from international and transnational
actors, such as norm entrepreneurs or social movements (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Nadelmann,
1990; Risse-Kappen et al., 1999). This ignored the role of the domestic political structure, as
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well as organizational and cultural variables in conditioning the reception of new global norms
(Checkel, 1998, 2001; Cortell & Davis Jr, 1996; Legro, 1996; Risse-Kappen, 1994) or other
types of entities such as regional, national, or even subnational groups (Legro, 1996). These
factors led a group of scholars to begin a second wave of norm-oriented constructivism to
consider a norm as a dynamic entity which depends on its norm takers’ community.
Second Wave of Norm-Oriented Constructivists
The second wave of norm-oriented constructivists attempted to address norm compliance
and norm contestation. This directly challenged the static feature of norms in the initial wave.
Second wave scholars focused on the conceptualization of the relationship between actors and
norms, which itself has roots in the broader question of whether actors reason through the norms
or if they reason about the norms, which is known as behavioral logic (March & Olsen, 1998).
The logic of behavior plays a crucial role in norm study and has divided constructivists across a
spectrum. At one end, scholars believe that a norm is something external to agents (at least
somewhat) and they can reason about it and manipulate it. At the other end of the spectrum, a
norm is something that shapes the agents’ understanding and their view of the world, thus they
reason through the norm.
The second wave of norm-oriented constructivists emphasized behavioral logic to address
the two main remaining challenges in the field: compliance and contestation. They addressed
compliance by explaining how actors react to external norms by using logic of consequence. In
this logic, actors look for what will maximize their utility. Actors can therefore reason about the
possible behaviors and decide how to behave (March & Olsen, 1998). Contestation, on the other
hand, explains how norm adaptors can change the meaning of a dominant norm through their
interpretation of an action in line with those interpretations using logic of appropriateness. In this
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logic, actors only behave based on what is appropriate in a specific situation and they can never
significantly remove themselves form their social structure to make independent judgments
(March & Olsen, 1998).
Compliance
This group stayed close to the initial wave. They considered very important and active
roles for agents; agents can stand outside their normative context and reason about the norm. The
focus of this group is to understand why some transnational ideas or norms will be successfully
accepted in some locales, but not in others e.g. (Acharya, 2004; Capie, 2008; Cortell & Davis,
2005; Farrell, 2005; Kornprobst, 2007; Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006). Acharya is one of the
pioneers in this group who offers the importance of agents’ cognitive acceptance. He explained
that the replacement of a good global norm with a bad local norm is not that easy because
sometimes it is a part of normative context. He proposed that norm diffusion is a dynamic
process in which agents reconstruct an external norm in the way that matches their local norms
and practice. He called this process “localization,” (Acharya 2004) which is different from mere
acceptance or rejection of the norm.
Another work in this area that received much attention is Checkel’s (1998) definition of
“cultural match” and its importance. This described a situation when a global norm is convergent
with all the local norms, the legal system, the discourse, and the bureaucracy. It is important
because there is a direct relation between norm diffusion speed and the cultural match. More
importantly, if there is not a cultural match, national discourse rejects the global norm (Corrales
& Feinberg, 1999).
Cortell and Davis (2005) offered the importance of “fit” between global norms and local
norms in the process of norm diffusion and compliance. A global norm is not something given to
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the state (external and static). Rather, it needs compliance through the dynamic process in which
states interact with the norm and localize it. As a result, states, as actors, play a significant role in
this process beyond being passive and might even manipulate the meaning of the norm (Ba,
2006).
Finally, Acharya (2013) also proposed an alternative framework of norm circulation. This
framework does not confine actors’ responses to a norm as rejection, adaptation, or resistance.
Instead, actors might provide feedback to the norm and send a new version of a norm to the
global system. Norm-oriented constructivists, after addressing some open questions from the first
wave via compliance, turned their interest toward contestation in the current wave.
Contestation
Contestation is a different way of studying norms from compliance. While focused on
compliance scholars mostly studied how actors socialized an external norm. However, they also
studied contestation within a community of norm acceptors. This group believes actors reason
through the norm. The questions they try to address are: how can norm acceptors understand the
norm in which they exist and, potentially, how can actors contest and reconstruct the norm of
community? Like compliance, in the context of contestation, a norm is not something static.
From this perspective, although a norm brings stability and normative context, it is also a
dynamic entity. It can change every day based on the actors’ beliefs and actions. As a result,
normative context is not something static (Sandholtz, 2008). Previously, a norm was considered
something that norm acceptors follow without challenge. However, scholars argue that
considering norms “a cause for behavior” is to ignore the conflicting situations (Wiener, 2004).
They claimed norms are unable to define all possible behaviors and a definite rule for all
situations (Gregg, 2003; Hoffmann, 2005; Van Kersbergen & Verbeek, 2007). This group more
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recently shifted to pay closer attention to the situation in which actors contest the social rule and
whether this action modifies/reshapes social rules and/or specific actions. Accordingly, actors as
subjects interpret and understand the general rules and decide how to behave (Cederman &
Daase, 2003; Chwieroth, 2008). Actors within a community of understanding vary and this might
cause a gap and contest between general rules and specific situations.
Sandholtz (2008) stated that “social rules guide the conduct of actors but … actors
constantly reshape the rules because the inescapable tension between general rules and specific
actions ceaselessly casts up disputes, which in turn generate arguments, which then reshape rules
and conduct.” He studied a wartime plunder norm and how contestation against it changed the
normative context (Sandholtz, 2007). While plundering was acceptable for centuries, Great
Britain contested that norm after Napoleon’s defeat—maybe because it was never conquered by
France—and argued against the normative/legal context that France should not be violated. Great
Britain used its undeniable diplomatic power to affect this change. Later, an anti-plunder norm
became institutionalized after WWII and Western states’ opposition against Soviet plundering of
Germany entrenched it further. Thus, after this contestation cycle between social rules and
specific situations, a new norm might strengthen, weaken, and be replaced by an old norm, but it
always becomes something different. Sandholtz’s study proved that sometimes norm
contestation behavior can change the normative context. In his case, a norm violator was a
prominent and powerful actor in IR, and they used their diplomatic power.
Although, in the example above, the United Kingdom, as a strong actor, was able to
contest and successfully change a norm, this is not always the case. As Deitelhoff and
Zimmermann (2020) mentioned, contestation has not always resulted in a complete norm
replacement. In a newly published book series, Johansson-Nogués, Vlaskamp, and Barbé
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(2020) show how great power contestation challenges have occurred but have not led to
complete replacement of the norm and values. For example, Vidal (2020) observed that China
is one of the powerful actors that have contested the European Union’s norm of protecting
citizens in the case of humanitarian crises. The European Union, as one powerful actor,
believes there is a responsibility to intervene when innocent citizens are influenced, as in the
case of genocide. China perceives this as intervention in another state’s sovereignty, which is
in contrast to its belief of a non-intervention foreign policy. In consequence, China used its
veto power with regard to intervention against the Assad regime in Syria and challenged the
global norm.
In other studies (Klossek, 2020) shows how rising conflict in many parts of the world
like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen made some big powers, like India, contest the global
norm of keeping local power engaged in the process of peace building. European Union policy
makers believe in the norms that local powers need to be involved in the process of
peacebuilding. India perceives this norm to be not as useful as it should be and in consequence
is contesting this norm and challenging European Union values.
The level of analysis in the norm contestation branch of constructivists is not limited to
the international level. There are also studies that focus on the domestic level of analysis. As
states like the United Kingdom or China, as a strong actor, can contest and challenge the global
norm at the international level, there exist powerful actors like states’ elites or government
officials within states that can challenge or change a dominant norm at the domestic level.
Another group of constructivists’ scholars has been studying how powerful actors can
challenge a dominant norm at the domestic level. Barnes (2016) investigated how the Bush
administration tried to revise the norm of torture and use it to its benefit. However, this study
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shows that torture remains taboo in the United States and the Bush administration’s attempt was
unsuccessful.
Sikkink (2013) discussed that how a “relatively small group of powerful political
operators” inside the United States during the Iraq war sought to undermine the norm of torture
to make these actions legitimate. In another study scholars examine how governmental actors
challenged the global norm of human rights after the 9/11 attack by giving priority to the norm of
counterterrorism (Heller, Kahl, & Pisoiu, 2012).
It is not surprising to see that strong actors can change the global norm, but how about
less powerful actors? This aspect of norm study in IR has been mostly ignored until recently.
Acharya (2011) developed a theory based on Slaughter’s (2004) idea of “norm subsidiarity” and
considered agency for weak states like the Middle East, Latin America, and African countries.
This proved that sometimes non-prominent state actors can contest and develop new regional
rules and norms, then offer those norms as another way to understand the global norm (e.g. PanArabism in the Middle East as opposed to the global norm). His work showed that weak states’
contestations, in contrast to the dominant belief in the field, mattered, and they have agency to
make changes.
Another important study of weak state contester, known as “rogue states” in the IR
literature, provided norm researchers with some new insights (Wunderlich, 2020). In Rogue
States as Norm Entrepreneurs, the author investigates the arms control policy of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, in which Iran traditionally has been considered as a norm breaker and
irrational. However, this study reveals that Iran can also be recognized as a legitimate and
rational norm entrepreneur (creator). Indeed, this research sheds light on the factors that are
important for contestation to be successful. This study is considered a state of the art in norm
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study in IR. In fact, it proves that contesters’ power level is not the sole determining factor in
whether contestation is successful, as it was perceived traditionally. There are other structural
and process factors which play important roles. These need much more attention and research.
So far existing literature focused on non-powerful actors is mainly at the international
level of analysis. Although the domestic level got some attention in the past, it was primarily
about powerful actors being the contester. But how about norm contestation by powerless
individual actors at the domestic level of analysis? Can norm violators, which the literature
considers to be outliers, and who were punished both by their government or their peers,
challenge or, ideally, change a dominant norm within their society? This is the question that this
study aims to address.
There are some successful examples of citizen contestations in the past like LGBTQ
rights in most Western countries, and abortion laws in Canada, Ireland, and elsewhere. Those
examples support scholarly claims that actors’ level of power is not the only determining factor
in changing a norm. Under suitable structural conditions, even powerless actors can trigger
change in a harmful norm (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019). However, those conditions and the
mechanism under which powerless actors’ contestations result in change or challenge of harmful
norms have been insufficiently studied and this study attempts to address this void in the
literature.
Problem Statement and Modeling Question
Constructivist school of thought is considered a bottom-up approach in IR, but what they
offer so far about study of the norm is mostly a top-down approach by powerful states or other
powerful actors. Much later, and more recently, scholars in this school proposed the real bottomup approach in norm study. They emphasized that weaker states as agents can interpret a
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dominant norm differently and oppose it. But what about individual citizens within a state?
Constructivists claimed that domestic collective beliefs and prevailing norms impact political
leaders’ decision making and, later, states’ behavior (Cortell & Davis, 2005; Sjöstedt, 2007;
Wendt, 1999). They consider norm study a mutual constitution of agent-structure. Thus, while
states’ policymakers shape the dominant norm or rule of societies, like powerful actors in the
international system, individual citizens, like non-prominent actors, may understand it differently
and contest the dominant norm when they find it harmful. This process might shape and reshape
both social rules and conduct of the actors. Thus, the central question of this study is as follows:
Under which conditions do powerless individual actors’ contestation of harmful dominant
norms cause the emergence of new norms which result in changes in states’ behavior.
It is important to study state behavior from this perspective because due to the main claim of
constructivists it is a real bottom-up approach which examines the mutual constitution of agentstructure. Figure.2. provides a general overview and a summary of the whole norm study in the
constructivist school of thought. The aim of this figure is to help better visualize where the
current study tries to contribute to the broader literature.
Having the general overview of norm study literature, Table 3. shows the literature of norm
emergence due to actors’ contestation and the area in which the study aims to contribute.
Expected Contributions
This study contributes theoretically to the existing literature in several areas as discussed
below:
The theoretical model which is built in this study not only is able to explain the existing
theories, but it also provides a new insight into the phenomenon of interest by developing
existing theories. Prior constructivists’ research has shown that norm emergence as a result of
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norm contestation of powerful actors and powerless actors is at the state level. This research
advances existing theory on norm emergence by both introducing a new type of actor at the nonstate actors’ level which result in norm emergence and by demonstrating the conditions under
which contestation of non-state actors can results in new norm. Thus, this research provides a
unique theoretical contribution to constructivist norm theory by advancing our understanding of
the process by which individuals within a community, a group of actors which is generally
ignored by other IR scholars, causes the emergence of new norms that affect state behavior.

Norm-Oriented Constructivists

Second Wave

First Wave

Conformance

Spreading

Leadership

Coercion

Competition

Emulation

Compliance

Emergence

Entrepreneurship

International
Organization

Transnational
Activists
Network

Contestation

Cultural Match Domestic Context Localization

Learning
Death

Figure 2. General Overview of the Constructivist’ Norm Study Literature

Roboustness

Norm
Emergence
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Table 3. Table of Contribution

Actors Level Approach

Norm Emergence
Powerful Actors

Powerless Actors

International Level
Sandholtz (2007);

Acharya (2011); (Wunderlich,

(Johansson-Nogués et al.,

2020)

2020)
Domestic Level
Barnes (2016); Sikkink
(2013)

This study’s contribution lies in
this section

Indeed, this research introduces two ideas: first, that norm violators can have a positive
impact and feeling on other members of society. While the literature mainly considers negative
feelings toward norm violators, the model developed here facilitates exploration of the
conditions in which that violation works as a motivator for others to violate the norm and pursue
a goal of abolishing it. Second, punishment, rather being a prohibitor, according to the literature,
can trigger more norm violation which is also another theoretical contribution in the field of
norm study. There are cases in which a government applied an unjustified punishment, or the
punishments were too severe according to its citizens, In those cases government punishment
may make people angry. Angriness increases risk taking and may exceed the fear of punishment
at some point. In such instances rather than punishment being a prohibitor, it becomes a
facilitator.
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Moreover, this study brings much-needed attention to cross-cultural norm emergence.
While literature mainly focuses on the democratic culture and actors, the scenarios in this study
compare two different democratic and loose cultures with non-democratic and tight societies, as
shown in Table 4. This study focuses on the two areas: societies which are democratic and loose
and the other end of the spectrum, non-democratic and tight societies.
On the other hand, society’s culture plays a crucial role in the structural factors of norm
emergence. There is a difference between democratic and non-democratic societies. There are
also differences in loose versus tight societies. Gelfand, Nishii, and Raver (2006) argue that this
tight versus loose culture affects the process of socialization which is the fundamental factor in
the process of norm emergence. Socialization is a complex process and has been studied by other
scholars in the field. For the purpose of this study I only provide a general definition of
socialization:
“Socialization is a complex process of learning and acquiring a norm by individuals that can
significantly affect individuals’ belief, perceptions, and behaviors (Clausen, 1968; Glasberg &
Shannon, 2010; Macionis, 2013).”

Table 4. Summary of Cultural Areas of Interest
Society’s Culture

Loose

Democratic

This study’s area of interest

Non-Democratic

Tight

This study’s area of interest
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Arnett (1995) defined and differentiated tight and loose societies in three ways:
sanctioning by government, sanctioning by peers, and educational resources. In other words, in
tight societies there exist higher peer-pressure and government pressure in comparison with loose
societies while there is less educational opportunity. As a result, socialization is narrow in tight
societies and is broad in loose societies. These three main factors which separated tight and loose
cultures from each other can be explained based on the three major institutions in societies:
family, media, and judicial system.
I.

Family and teachers in tight societies invite children to be more rule obedient and there
exists stricter monitoring of children’s behavior (Holloway, 1999) which obviously
affects socialization processes and, as a result, individuals’ feeling of accountability.
People in those societies bind themselves more to the norm and rules. Hence, peerpressure is higher in tight societies not only in the way individuals feel the pressure of
their peers but indeed, they put more pressure on norm violators (Rucker, Polifroni,
Tetlock, & Scott, 2004; Tetlock, 2002)

II.

Media is another institution that narrows socialization in tight societies. By restricting
and regulating its content, social media causes narrow socialization (Sussman &
Karlekar, 2002), In loose societies, the media’s content is more diverse and open. In
addition, media are less prone to regulation, control, and political pressure as to
whether their content is acceptable (Sussman & Karlekar, 2002). As a result, one of two
major sources of education in tight societies is much more restricted.

III.

Criminal justice systems play a key role in socialization. Tight societies are prone to
sanction violators more often and with restrictive tools. In comparison with loose
societies, sanctioning through criminal justice institutions is more restrictive in tight
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societies, for example the death penalty for drug offenses in Singapore (Amnesty
International, 2002, 2004). Thus, in tight societies people expect stronger punishment.
In short, we can say that tight society has a narrow socialization due to limited educational
resources and more often and stronger sanctioning. Figure 3. summarizes these claims.

Relatively Stricter Education
Narrow Socialization
Tight Culture
Relatively More and Stricter
Sanctioning
Cultural Componants
Relatively More Lenient
Education

Loose Culture
Broad Socialization

Relatively Less Sanctioning

Figure 3. Summary of Cultural Tightness-Looseness

As discussed earlier, these factors, which have their roots in the culture of a society, play
an important role in the emergence of a contesting norm. In this research I examine that while the
relative power of contesters is equal in both cultures, different structural factors might be needed
to have a new norm emerge.
Conclusion
Constructivists used to consider no role for actors and studied norm through the structure,
however, some empirical studies challenged that view and encouraged constructivists to consider
agency for norm takers. However, for a long time afterwards, constructivists believed that only
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powerful actors could challenge and change an existing norm. But a comprehensive literature
review reveals that in contrast to the dominant view in the field this is not always the case. And
many more recent studies of powerless states’ norm breaking at the international level proves
that norm contesters’ relative power is not the only factor which affects the decay or change of
an existing norm. Rather, there exist other structural factors which play an important role in this
process. However, due to the dominant belief in the field, there is less attention to those factors
and there is a need for several studies and much more attention. This study is an attempt to
address this existing open question in the field and determine the suitable conditions and factors
which are needed for a new norm to emerge across two different cultures. To address this
question, I will use modeling and simulation approaches. I will discuss that method in detail in
the following chapter.
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RESEARCH METHODS

Introduction
The Modeling and Simulation (M&S) approach is used to address the research question;
Under which conditions do powerless individual actors’ contestation of harmful dominant
norms cause the emergence of new norms which result in changes in states’ behavior. This
section begins with a broad overview of the potential value of a modeling and simulation
approach, and then discusses the specific M&S paradigm used to address that question—theory
building paradigm. This paradigm is a multi-step process that I will explain in detail. It is
composed of building a conceptual model, causal loop analysis, simulation model, and, finally,
analyzing the result to generate a new theory and new insight which contribute to the field. I
close the chapter with a brief conclusion.
Modeling and Simulation in International Studies (IS)
M&S is a field or subfield which has several important contributions within social
science. It is a branch of computer science and engineering, but in the recent decades after it
proved that it could be a useful approach in other fields (Iannaccone & Makowsky, 2007;
Squazzoni, 2012), social scientists have increasingly turned to uses of computational modeling
including agent-based modeling, system dynamic modeling, geographic information systems,
and network analysis to address open questions in the field.
IS scholars increasingly use computational M&S because of the utility of these models
for depicting complex systems and situations with a broad range of possible outcomes which
makes it hard for policy makers to quickly consider them all at once. Thus, M&S is needed to
overcome these complexities. There is no definite agreement between scholars about what

36

complexity is, but they all agree that when there is not a linear relationship between cause and
effect, it causes complexity. Because of this nonlinear relationship, individuals are not able to
identify or visualize all possible outcomes, or even the probability of particular outcomes
(Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010). In addition, one of the very important confusions one
experiences in IS is how they should treat some feature of the world politics, such as path
dependence or a transnational network, theoretically based on the traditional levels of analysis.
Waltz (1959) discussed that there exist three levels of analysis: individual, state, and
international system and he neglects the importance of a transnational network in world politics.
M&S can also be used for experimentation when we know that a real experiment is not possible.
For example, I am interested in the conditions under which norm contestation results in
emergence of a new norm. I am not able to conduct a real experiment and no amount of
interviewing, statistical analysis, or case studies will allow me to understand that. The simulation
runs create data by running different scenarios in a simulated world rather in the real world.
M&S has several paradigms among which I use primarily an inductive theory building paradigm
in this project.
Theory Building Paradigm
Theory building paradigm is a multistep process. Figure 4. depicts the general overview
of this dynamic process and, in what follows, I discuss each step of the process in detail.
The process begins when a scholar comes up with the research question thorough
literature review in the domain of interest. This is followed by constructing dynamic hypotheses
or a conceptual model, which might later be changed. In the next step, researchers use causal
loop diagrams (CLD) to depict the conceptual model and use it to build a simulation model. The
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CLD might be adjusted and modified through this part of the process which would modify the
conceptual model later.

Figure 4. General Overview of Modelling and Simulation’s Theory Building Paradigm

After having a simulation model, we need to validate the model’s structure and behavior.
It is important to mention that the CLD’s analysis results must be the same as the simulation
model results and then we can say the conceptual model and the simulation model are consistent.
Finally, we need to determine a combination of parameter values that provide an answer for the
research question which contribute to and explain the literature. The next section will apply these
steps in the context of my research.
Conceptual Model/Dynamic Hypothesis
After coming up with the research question, I did a comprehensive literature review of all
dominant and major norm study approaches to find out which approach and theory is most
appropriate to address the research question and to build a conceptual model. I considered the

38

three main existing theories in the literature of norm study. These are socialized actor theory,
cost-benefit theory, and social identity theory. Each are described below.
Socialized Actor Theory
Socialized actor theory, also known as structural functionalism, has mainly been used in
sociology, first developed by Parsons, (1951). He was inspired by Durkheim and his idea that
“Social Facts are things” (Durkheim, 1964, 1982). For Durkheim social fact is objective and
reality should be treated as a thing. In other words, social structure creates a fixed objective
which exists permanently. It is a constant standard, usable for the observer, and there is no room
for subjective interpretation or personal observation. It is independent of individual’s will and
preference, and it holds a whole society together. It is external to any given individual. For
Parsons, phenomena are known by their function and inherent properties and not as an idea of
the mind. Social fact constrains/governs behavior and the norm is one kind of social fact. He
defines it as “…a thing that many people do very similarly because the socialized community
that they belong to has influenced them to do these things or a concrete idea that affected a
person's everyday life” (Parsons, 1951).
Parsons, who was inspired by both Durkheim and Webber, initially considered a role for
individuals in his theory of socialized actor. Individuals in this theory are able to choose among
alternatives. A common value system is the thing which brought social order and stability into
society, and this common value system is embodied in norms. Social stability occurs when
society follows a common value system or norms. The value system constructs the individual’s
identity and consequently, the individual willingly obeys the common value system. Therefore, a
norm is something stable and exogenous and conformity to a norm is something that happens
through socialization and internalization. Based on this theory, socialization, which happens
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during childhood, causes norms to be internalized. People behave and obey the norm as it is a
normative structure of the society.
Cost-Benefit Theory
Cost-benefit theory has been mostly used among rationalist-economists and emphasizes
the role of individuals’ decision making. Here a norm refers to individual rational choice
evolution through a series of game interactions to maximize the utility. Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) define an individual as a rational actor who tries to maximize their utility. A
payoff-maximizing strategy and external sanctioning motivate conformity. Homans (1958) and
Blau (1964) developed the social exchange theory to study norms through social interaction, and
later (Coleman, 1994) expanded this approach. This way of seeing social phenomenon led to the
study of norms under the category of “individualism.” Norm study is based on individual
decision making and rationality.
Social Identity Theory
Social identity theory (SIT) explains how individuals’ norms and behaviors are shaped.
To SIT scholars, social norm/identity should be considered a key motivational factor to explain
individuals’ behavior. This approach is mostly used among social psychologists and
anthropologists. From this perspective, there is an inevitable connection between members’
social identity and group behavior. The theory explains how group norms can change
individuals’ norms and behavior. SIT is relevant for this study since it shows how a new norm
forms at the individual level and later spreads among other group members with the same
interests potentially evolving, strengthening, or weakening the dominant norm (See Figure 4.
from above).
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Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987) later clarified the difference
between personal and social identity in their “self-categorization theory.” They believe joining a
group makes individuals perceive the similarity and solidarity within the group and themselves
as a typical group member. In other words, people perceived themselves primarily based on their
reference/relevant groups rather than upon their personal identity. Based on this theory,
whenever social identity becomes salient, the cognitive mechanism of in-group categorization
activates scripts or schemata. As a result, group behavior will shape or reshape. This stereotype
activation makes individuals depersonalize themselves and, instead of perceiving themselves as a
unique person, they perceive themselves within the group’s characteristics, values, interests, and
goals. In this theory, people’s motivation to conform to group norms comes from their desire to
validate their identity as group-members.
After considering these three separate theories, I determined that social identity theory is
the best fit to answer this study’s question.
Why Social Identity Theory?
To answer why I think this theory is the most appropriate one to proceed with, I need to
discuss one very important and ongoing debate among scholars: the structure-agency3 problem.

3

Structure is a pattern of law which influences or limits the available choices. Agency is a capacity by which actors

can, independent of that existing structure, make choices Barker, C. (2003). Cultural studies: Theory and practice,
Sage.
Agency role has its root in philosophical concept of subjectivity. In other words, norm takers are subjects
who have their own experiences and consciousness Honderich, T. (2005). The Oxford companion to philosophy, OUP
Oxford.
.
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For a long time, scholars including first wave of norm-oriented constructivists, believed that
there is a structure that affects agents’ behavior and decision making. In other words, the
structure shapes or forms the interaction between actors. This group follows Durkheim and his
philosophy. However, Weber’s ideas drastically challenged this dominant belief in the field and
led to the introduction of subjectivity for agents. In this sense actors’ interactions reshape the
structure. These two statements led some scholars to come up with the conclusion that the agent
and structure are interdependent.
The structure-agency issue led norm study scholars to study human behavior based on
different logics. Socialized actors’ theory, following structuralism, believes that structure shapes
actors’ values and behavior; actors have no subjectivity to decide and act independently. This is
what March and Olsen (1998) called “logic of appropriateness," which means actors can never
significantly remove themselves form their social structure to make an independent judgment.
They just behave based on what it is appropriate to do in a specific situation. This means
individuals do not have agency and the main player is the structure. Once a norm is accepted it is
almost impossible to change it until the whole structure changes. As I discussed earlier in detail,
as well as in the literature review, the initial wave of norm-oriented constructivists falls into this
category of scholars; they do not consider real agency for actors.
At the other end of the spectrum are cost-benefit theorists, which are also called the
individualistic group. They believe in the logic of consequence (March & Olsen, 1998). These
theorists believe actors can reason about the possible behaviors and decide how to behave.
Furthermore, they believe actors do what will maximize utility. The cost-benefit model suffers
from not only several sanctioning issues, but indeed, from disregarding individuals’ values and
expectations as a result of emphasizing mainly autonomous decision making (Axelrod, 1986;
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Scott, 1971). To address this body of shortcomings, Bicchieri (2006) suggested that individuals’
decisions are influenced by social preference and normative structure. In this perspective, social
situations activate a script for actors in the game that iterates that general script and leads to the
emergence of the norm. However, framing a social situation is still a matter of debate.
But social identity theory is an approach which enables us to study norm emergence
mechanisms as agent and structure shape and reshape each other. It provides agency for actors,
(socialized actor’s theory does not) when they are aware of their personal identity and interests.
That identity is shaped and reshaped through interactions within their group. On the other hand,
the group itself, as an actor, can later expand to other members of the society and change the
dominant structure. This is something the cost-benefit model cannot explain. This fits my study
of norm emergence through individuals’ norm contestation. Thus, for the purpose of this study,
social identity theory fits the best.
It is necessary to mention that each theory and paradigm has its own advantages and
limitations; social identity theory is not an exception. For example, it is hard to predict how
people will behave when their two different roles or identities are at cross-purposes such as when
a woman’s gender identity contradicts her religious identity. Each of the above theories is
appropriate for different questions and to answer this study question, knowing all advantages and
limitations, I found SIT the most appropriate. As Geddes (2003) states, “Decisions about what
approach to take to particular research questions should be based on assessments of what kind of
leverage different approaches offer for answering the question of interest.”
After assessing and evaluating which theory is the best fit to my research question, I built
the conceptual model. A dynamic hypothesis or conceptual model is used to establish a
consistent logic about a norm emergence phenomenon within huge bodies of literature, its
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dynamic relations, and its interpretations. These relationships and their interpretations are shown
in a list of 42 claims and assumption statements in the conceptual model chapter. Claims are
statements which are supported by at least one citation within the norm emergence literature
explicitly. Logical extensions of claims are called assumptions. Rather than developing the
entire model here, the purpose in this chapter is to discuss the methods used.
Causal Loop Diagrams
Dynamic hypothesises are depicted by using the CLD to capture the logical relationships
between norm emergence variables as described in or inferred from the literature. The CLD
depicts reinforcing loops and balancing loops. Reinforcing and balancing loops respectively
cause positive and negative effects. Each loop starts at a variable and moves forward in the
direction which leads back to the starting variable. An example of a CLD is illustrated below:

Group Behavior

Pro-Group
Emotion +

+
Perceiving Similarity
Based on Shared Interest

+

Risk Taking
R2

Promoting
Perceiving Similarity

+

Likelihood of
Feeling Angry
+ Violators Group
Formation

+ Punishment

Figure 5. Promoting Perceiving Similarity, R2
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In the Figure 5., Promoting Perceiving Similarity, R2 (Campos-Vazquez & Cuilty, 2014;
Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Turner, 1985; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Turner, Reynolds, Haslam,
& Veenstra, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Villatoro, Sen, & Sabater-Mir, 2010; Yang,
2000) is illustrated. Perception of similarity resulted in the violators group formation, which in
turn triggers government’s punishment. Punishment increases feelings of angriness. As a result,
people take more risk and that increases group behavior. More group behavior increases the progroup emotion which later strengthens the perception of similarity.

Personal Values

-

Dominant/Old Norm

Contesting/New
Norm

+
Personal Norm

+
Group Behavior
R9

+
Personal Identity

+

Increasing Risk
Taking

Risk Taking
+
+

Perception of Similarity
Based on Shared Interest

+ Violators Group
Formation

+ Punishment

Likelihood of
Feeling Angry

Figure 6. Increasing Risk Taking, R9

In the more complex example shown in Figure 6., Increasing Risk Taking, R9 (CamposVazquez & Cuilty, 2014; Dechesne, Dignum, & Tan, 2011; Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Turner &
Reynolds, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Vickers, 1973; Villatoro et al., 2010). Personal
values shape personal norms and personal norms shape personal identity. The stronger one’s
personal identity, the more an individual perceives the similarity and is more likely to join the
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violators group which in turn triggers government’s punishment. Punishment increases feeling of
angriness. As a result, people take more risk and that increases group behaviour. The more group
behaviour, the greater number of people adopt the new norm, which later decreases the old norm
followers and strengthen the personal values.
Simulation Model
I use system dynamic modelling to implement the conceptual model. The models for this
research are built in Vensim. One important question which is worthwhile to discuss before
explaining the simulation model is why this study needs a simulation model. If the CLD provides
insights by itself, then what does one gain from the simulation model for a theory-driven model
that one cannot get out of the causal loop diagrams alone? Scholars have different views on this
question and consider different value for either qualitative or quantitative models.
The need for only the qualitative model or both qualitative and quantitative model is a
debate which can be traced back at least to a claim by Wolstenholme (1985). He inferred those
dynamics are possible and even preferable when building a quantitative model is very difficult or
costly from a qualitative map. Later, Coyle (2000) went even further and challenged the traditional
belief in the need for the quantitative model in system dynamics. He discussed some pure
qualitative models that led to policy making.
Qualitative models might provide some insight for researchers, but they cannot capture
the complex real-world effects such as accumulation/delay, feedback, and non-linearity. In
addition, simulation models provide modelers with higher “levels of evidence” to test the model.
Scholars believe that any model needs strong behavioral and structural evidence to be tested
(Homer, 2014). Subject-matter experts provide models with structural evidence while the only
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way to provide behavioral evidence is to compare the model output with existing data or records.
To have a strong support for both structure and behavior one needs the simulation model.
Finally, CLD might provide us with dynamic insight about the system. However, in many
cases, including this study, it does not provide modelers with enough details. The CLD for this
study shows that to have a new contesting norm emerge, a society needs to perceive the
similarity with norm violators. Meanwhile, results from a simulation model inform me about the
needed percentage of similarity required for a new norm to emerge in a society under specific
assumptions about the operation of a range of other social factors. In other words, CLD gives us
general insight into the question, but a simulation model provides us with more details about that
same information.
Knowing the importance of a simulation model alongside a qualitative model, I choose
the system dynamic approach to build the simulation model. There are two main reasons I
selected this type of model to implement the conceptual model over other modelling approaches.
First, as I discussed in the literature review, scholars believe that under suitable structural
conditions even powerless actors can cause the emergence of a new norm. Investigating those
structural factors is the main goal of this study. System dynamics modeling is an approach which
enables me to understand those structures and their dynamic process. It allows me to investigate
which structural factors are important or crucial and how those factors play roles in the dynamic
process. However, I acknowledge that a system dynamics model is less promising when it
comes to investigating people’s daily behavior under a contesting environment.
Second, System Dynamics (SD) modeling can provide the explanation for the cause of
behavior. In other words, scholars in the field of norm and behavioral studies mostly focus on
norms and changing individuals’ behavior by collecting data and doing real world experiments.
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However, SD modeling enables readers to understand the cause of that behavior by exploring
how different processes need to come together during a dynamic process to cause the overall
pattern of behavior.
System Dynamics Modeling
SD is a computer simulation approach which enables modelers to study complex and
dynamic physical and social problems or behaviors, as well as analyze and design related policy
(Forrester, 1958). In this approach, system structure, or any dynamic problem, is shown by stock,
flow, and auxiliary variables.
Stocks/State Variables
Variables which take time to accumulate stuff are considered and modeled as stock.
Stocks may either grow or shrink. Stocks are very important in SD because they play the role as
a memory of the system. Stocks remember the effect of the stuff that accumulates in them and
that provide memory for the system. Indeed, stocks give the system inertia. As stocks grow and
get bigger, this pushes the system to change and move. Moreover, stocks create time delays in
the system. Or, in other words, time lags between when parts of the system are changed and
when we feel the impact of that change. Thus, they play a crucial role in these models of the
dynamic system. Finally, stocks are the basis for decision and action. In other words, to decide
and design a new policy we need to know the status of each stock.
It is important to note that stocks could be either conserved or not conserved. Conserved,
which are also considered material stuff, are those stuffs or stocks which cannot be created or
destroyed in the system such as people, a car, or a project. In contrast is non-conserved stuff, also
considered information, which can be created and destroyed in the system. Examples of nonconserved stocks are feelings, price, and stress. These try to reach a target value.
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Flows/Rates
While stocks are accumulations of stuff, a SD model needs another element to show the
movement of those items among stocks or among stocks and the environment. Flows are
components which show the movement of stuff in or out of stocks over time or, in other words,
changes in stock over time.
Auxiliary Variables
These variables represent non-linearity or graphical functions. They usually are a
function of several other variables which could be constant, another auxiliary, and/or a stock. In
Chapter 5, I explain the SD model in detail (from David Ford’s notes on System Dynamics
Summer School 2020). Figure 7. shows the simple stocks, flow, and auxiliary variables.

Figure 7. A Simple Stock and Flow Connection
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The above image might depict a stock and flow connection. However, it is not a system
dynamic model yet. Any system dynamic model has feedback, otherwise it is not SD. Feedback
loops enable us to understand and explain the design of the system and thus manage the system
with which we are working (from David Ford’s notes on System Dynamics Summer School
2020). Earlier, I discussed two casual loop diagrams. The SD simulation model has the same
loops as CLD which is one path to structural validation. In Figure 8. I provide one of the
simulation model feedback loops. Scholars believe that the feedback loops are “building blocks
for articulating the dynamics of these models and their interactions can represent and explain
system behavior” (Choucri et al., 2007).

Figure 8. A Simple Stock and Flow Model

Model Validation & Verification
Validation in SD modeling means transferring confidence to others who were not
involved in building the model (Senge & Forrester, 1980). Model builders accumulate
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confidence about model usefulness while building the model and observing expected behavior.
However, model validation is not limited to its constructors. It can be extended to any person
who is not involved in building that model to gain their confidence. Senge and Forrester (1980)
discuss that to gain that common confidence about model usefulness in SD, the models’ structure
and behavior need to be tested. They explain several different tests and emphasize that based on
the model’s purpose, model builders must pick among the available tests to build the soundness
of their model. However, one must accept the impossibility of absolute validity or confidence
(Sterman, 2002). Similarly, prior to conducting experiments, I develop confidence that the
simulation model is useful for its intended purpose through a process of validation. I test both
structure and behavior of the system which will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Analyzing the Results and Answer to the Research Question
After gaining confidence about the model usefulness, one needs to conduct experiments
using a combination of parameter values to find the associated emergent equilibrium and then
analyze those datasets to generate insight into the system. I define the parameter samples for
simulation experiments based on the results of a sensitivity analysis test. That test enables me to
recognize which parameters are the key ones. After having key parameters and allocating their
initial values, the simulation scenario is ready to be run and generate insight. Finally, the insight
that is gained through simulation results provides an answer to the research question, and later
explains and contributes to the literature.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I discuss the importance of using modeling and simulation and its ability
to generate data through a simulated world in cases like this study where there is no possibility of
conducting real-world experiments and data collection. Then I discussed one specific modeling
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and simulation paradigm which is used to conduct this research: the theory building paradigm. I
explained this paradigm in several steps: after coming up with the research question one builds a
conceptual model. I will discuss the conceptual model in detail in the following chapter.
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CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Introduction
In the previous chapter, I noted that the first step in building a theoretical model is
coming up with a research question, then building a conceptual model/dynamic hypothesis based
on the existing literature. In this chapter, I explain the steps which I took to build a conceptual
model. I first studied the three main norm-study’s existing theories in the literature, and based on
being the most appropriate to address this study’s research question, I selected social identity
theory and built my conceptual model. Finally, I turned my conceptual model into a CLD which
provides me with the opportunity to implement my model in the computational modeling setting.
What is Social Identity Theory?
Social identity theory (SIT) explains how individuals’ norms and behaviors are shaped
through their interactions. To SIT scholars, social norms4 and, consequently, social identity5
should be considered a key motivational factor to explain individuals’ behavior. This approach is
mostly used among social psychologists and anthropologists. From this perspective, there is an
inevitable connection between members’ social identity and group behavior. Thus, it shows how
group norms changed individuals’ norms and behavior. SIT fits this study because it shows the
process of how a new norm spreads among other group members with same interests and then
has the potential to eventually evolve, strengthen, and weaken the dominant norm.

4

Social norms are informal rules that groups adopt to group members' behavior Feldman, D. C. (1984). "The
development and enforcement of group norms." Academy of management review 9(1): 47-53.
.
5
Social identity is a part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from one’s knowledge of one’s membership
of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership; according to Turner,
group identity is basically a cognitive mechanism whose adaptive function is to make “group behavior” possible
Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology, Cup Archive.
.
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Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987) proposed the “self-categorization
theory” which is a foundation on which to build a conceptual model. Based on this theory,
individuals have personal norms that shape their identity and interests. Individuals perceive their
similarity6 with others based on those interests. This perception of similarity is a key element in
shaping a new category.7 By joining the category, group members learn and assign a group norm.
Authors believe joining a group makes individuals perceive the similarity and solidarity within
the group and view themselves as a typical group member. In other words, people perceive
themselves primarily based on their reference group and its norm and goals. Shared goals
provide trust8 and cooperation among group members. If a person perceives that their goal is
different from the group, they distrust the group norm and perceive dissimilarity with other
members. As a result, they begin making dissimilarity focused comparisons9 and become
detached from the group. Based on this theory, group norm activation makes individuals
depersonalize10 and self-stereotype11 which leads to internalization12 of the group norm. Those

6

Similarity is perceived as a factor of interest. And different things might define interests such as history, gender, or
many other factors Turner, J. C. and K. J. Reynolds (2011). "Self-categorization theory." Handbook of theories in
social psychology 2(1): 399-417.
.
7
For this study we use category and group interchangeably.
8

It includes both emotional and cognitive dimensions and functions as a deep assumption underwriting social order
Dirks, K. T. and D. L. Ferrin (2001). "The role of trust in organizational settings." Organization science 12(4): 450467.
.
9
Social judgment is based on the comparison mechanism; in other words, we compare targets with comparison
standards on the dimension of interests. Mussweiler, T. (2003). "Comparison processes in social judgment:
mechanisms and consequences." Psychological review 110(3): 472.
.
10
A cognitive definition of self from unique attribution to shared category membership and associated stereotypes,
cognitive redefinition of self Turner, J. C. (1984). "Social identification and psychological group formation." The
social dimension: European developments in social psychology 2: 518-538.
.
11
It happens when people see themselves more alike in a category’s stereotypes and clichés ibid.
.
12
People assign norms and attributes of the category to themselves; when norm is given for granted Turner, J. C. and
K. J. Reynolds (2011). "Self-categorization theory." Handbook of theories in social psychology 2(1): 399-417.
.

54

who internalize the norm begin to behave based on the norm. They promote the norm and, after a
while, the norm will become normative. This is a concise explanation of a self-categorization
theory which, as I mentioned earlier, is foundational for my conceptual model. It should be noted
that this theory mainly explains emergence of a group/social norm which does not contest with
the dominant norm; this is not the case for this study. In SIT, group members begin to behave
based upon the norm once they internalize that norm. This research is focused on new norms that
contest the existing ones. In this research, group members who internalize these emerging norms
risk punishment if they decide to behave based on the new norm, since their behavior for
excepting norms goes against laws (Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Villatoro, 2010). To capture that
risk-taking, I create a distinct variable of risk-taking portion in the conceptual model.
Based on the existing literature of collective action, risk taking depends on the perceived
cost and benefit. In other words, individuals in a society are rational actors and take risks based
on a cost-benefit calculation (Granovetter, 1987; Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). For this
study, costs that decrease risk taking are considered negative emotions13 and benefit, which
increase risk taking, is considered a positive emotion that might be experienced in the process of
contesting an existing norm. Psychology literature is used to clarify how these two general
groups of emotion are defined. Psychologists have argued that humans have five main basic
emotions—fear, sadness, anger, joy, and disgust—which shape their behavior and risk-taking
decision making. For this study, we define negative feeling as the sum of fear, which could be

13

A momentarily good or bad state which arises based on the situations; the positive or negative feeling, which could
be conscious or unconscious Schwarz, N. and G. L. Clore (1983). "Mood, misattribution, and judgments of wellbeing: informative and directive functions of affective states." Journal of personality and social psychology 45(3):
513.
, Clore, G. L., et al. (2001). "Affect as information." Handbook of affect and social cognition: 121-144.
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fear of losing a job, money, or being arrested, with a feeling of disgust because of being
abandoned by peers. Positive feelings are the sum of anger because of unjustified government
punishment with pro-category emotion. Pro-category emotion composes feelings of sadness of
having shared grievances with violators and feelings of joy while violating norm and receiving
admiration.14 In my model, group members, after internalizing the group norm, take risks based
on their cost and benefit calculation and behave against the dominant norm.
Now that I have described the theory, I will explain how I established a consistent logic
about a norm emergence phenomenon within this body of literature to shape my dynamic
hypothesis.
Dynamic Hypothesis
The main point of the dynamic hypothesis or conceptual model is to establish a consistent
logic about a norm emergence within huge bodies of literature, its dynamic relations, and its
interpretations. These relationships and their interpretations are shown in a list of 38 claims and
assumption statements (see Table 5. & Table 6.). Claims are statements which are explicitly
supported by at least one citation within the norm emergence literature. Logical extensions of
claims are called assumptions.
Before explaining the CLD, it should be noted that all the variables in table 6 are
endogenous variables, however, there are some exogenous variables in the system which needed
to be explained. One of those variables is First Violation of dominant norm. Scholars believe that
when people find some problem with the existing norm, especially when there is a problem that
is not compatible with their values, they try to promote a norm which they believe is beneficial

14

Individuals fulfill their interests like improving their statuses in the group or receiving more admiration and will
take more risks. In other words, risk is a cultural value Forsyth, D. R. (1990). Group dynamics . California: Brooks,
Cole Publishing Company.
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for a society (Dechesne et al., 2011; Vickers, 1973). However, those people begin promoting
their norm while using similar language to eventually change the old norm. In this study, people
who find a problem with an existing norm begin violating that norm; I call that “First Violation.”
It is the intervening factor which initially triggers a society’s attention and action.

Table 5. Model’s Endogenous Claims and Assumptions
Claim/
Model Variables

Assumption

#

Description

References

Personal Values

Claim

1

Individuals’ values have their roots in

(Bicchieri, 2006;

the societies’ culture, religion, social

Parsons & Shils,

media, rules, and normative structure

1951; Schwartz,
1992; Zaidise,
2004; Cline, 1975)

Personal Value

Assumption

2

Contesting norm affects personal Value.

Logical

extension

of claim #1

Personal Value

Assumption

3

Dominant norm affects personal value

Logical

extension

of claim #1

Personal Norm

Claim

4

Personal values shape personal norms;

(Dechesne,

norm is a tool to achieve goals

Dignum, & Tan,
2011; Vickers,
1973)

Pro- Group Emotion

Claim

5

Personal norms shape personal emotion

(Mercer, 2014)

Pro- Group Emotion

Claim

6

Violation of a norm causes pro-category

(Snow, Rochford Jr

emotion among those who have a shared

et al. 1986, Forsyth

feeling of grievance and indeed among

1990, Snow and

those who see violators as brave and risk

Benford 1992)

takers individuals and admire them
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Table 5. Continued
Claim/
Model Variables

Assumption

#

Description

References

Pro- Group Emotion

Claim

7

Group violation causes pro-emotion

(Yang, 2000)

among others

Personal Identity

Claim

8

Personal norm shapes personal identity

(Winston, 2018)

Violators Group

Claim

9

Perception of similarity based on

(Granovetter,

shared interest shapes a new group

1987)

Anger increases risk taking

(Campos-Vazquez

Formation

Risk Taking

Claim

10

& Cuilty, 2014;
Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992)
Risk Taking

Claim

11

Pro-group emotion increases risk-

(Campos-Vazquez

taking

& Cuilty, 2014;
Nguyen &
Noussair, 2014)

Risk Taking

Claim

12

Fear decreases risk taking

(Wake,
Wormwood, &
Satpute, 2020)

Risk Taking

Assumption

13

Peer-pressure decreases risk taking

Logical extension
of claim #12

Likelihood of

Assumption

14

Feeling Angry

Punishment might cause anger among

Based on historical

people who perceive the same

evidence

grievances
Feeling of Fear

Claim

15

Punishment causes fear as it challenges

(Granovetter, 1987;

individuals’ interest

Posner &
Rasmusen, 1999)
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Table 5. Continued
Claim/
Model Variables

Assumption

#

Description

References

Peer-Pressure /

Claim

16

Individuals feel in-group peer pressure

(Turner, 1991;

to behave based on the group norm

Salimi,

otherwise they will be perceived

Frydenlund,

disgusting and abandoned by their

Padilla, Haaland, &

peers

Wallevik, 2018)

Normative context affects the personal

(Mead, Rimal,

behavior

Ferrence, & Cohen,

feeling of disgust

Behavior

Claim

17

2014)
Peer-Pressure

Dominant norm affects perception of

Logical extension

peer pressure

of claim # 17

New norm affects perception of peer

Logical extension

pressure

of claim # 17

Personal identity shapes personal

(Snow & Benford,

Similarity Based on

interests and their perception of

1992; Snow et al.,

Shared Interest

similarity

1986)

The pro-group emotion makes others

(Snow & Benford,

Similarity Based on

perceive the similarity with violators

1992; Snow et al.,

Shared Interest

based on their shared interests

1986)

There is always a probability that

(Posten &

Defining

individuals find their initial goals are

Mussweiler, 2013)

Incompatible Goal

not incompatible with a group norm

Peer-Pressure

Perceiving

Perceiving

Likelihood of

Doing Dissimilarity

Assumption

Assumption

Claim

Assumption

Claim

Claim

18

19

20

21

22

23

Focused

Distrust awakens the dissimilarity

(Posten &

comparison

Mussweiler, 2013)

Incompatible goals cause distrust

(Posten &

Compression
Emergence of
Distrust Toward
Category Norm

Claim

24

Mussweiler, 2013)
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Table 5. Continued
Claim/
Model Variables

Assumption

#

Description

References

Learn & Assign

Claim

25

Each group has its own norm and by

(Turner, 1984;

joining the distinct category, group

Turner et al, 1987)

Norm of the Group

members will learn about the norm and
start assigning the group norm
Depersonalization

Claim

26

The more members assign the group

(Turner et al.,

norm, the more they depersonalize and

1987)

self-stereotype
Internalization of

Claim

27

the Norm

Group Behavior

Emergence of New

Claim

Claim

28

29

Norm

Group Behavior

The more individuals self-stereotype,

(Turner et al.,

the more they internalize the norm

1987)

Group members behave because of

(Turner et al.,

norm internalization

1987)

Group behavior will become normative

(Turner et al, 1987)

after a while

Claim

30

Punishment decreases the group

(Posner &

violating behavior

Rasmusen, 1999;
Villatoro, 2010)

Group Behavior

Claim

31

Risk taking increases group members’

(Forsyth, 1990)

riskier behavior or more violating
behavior
Emergence of New

Claim

32

Norm

legal norm’s strength, weakens the

(Deitelhoff &

contesting norm

Zimmermann,
2019)

Dominant
Norm/Legal Norm

Assumption

33

Contesting a norm weakens the legal

Logical extension

norm (the population size of either

of claim # 32

contesting or legal norm balance each
other)
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Table 5. Continued
Claim/
Model Variables

Assumption

#

Description

References

Punishment

Assumption

34

Dominant norm population increases

Logical

government punishment (government

of claim # 32

extension

power is considered as a population who
support

them.

Thus,

when

huge

population follow and obey them
government has more power to punish
and vice versa.
Punishment

Assumption

35

New norm population increases

Logical

extension

government punishment (see

of claim # 32

assumption # 34)
Punishment

Punishment

Assumption

Assumption

36

37

Violators group population increases

Logical

extension

government punishment

of claim # 32

Norms internalized and group

Logical

population increases government

of claim # 32

extension

punishment

Another exogenous variable is Extreme Behaviour which causes anti-category emotion
and reduces the group violating behaviour. I summarize these variables in Table 6. In many
historical and/or political events we witness that some violators exhibit extreme behavior, like set
a fire on public transportation or vandalize public places. Those behaviours cause anti-category
emotion which reduce group behaviour and indeed trigger prompt government punishment.
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Table 6. Model’s Exogenous Claims and Assumptions
Claim/
Model Variables

Assumption

#

Description

Reference

Pro-category

Assumption

38

Violation of a dominant norm triggers

Based

pro-category emotion

historical

Emotion

on

evidence like
Inqilab Girls
Extreme Behavior

Claim

39

It is always possible that members lose

(Forsyth,

their awareness and show extreme

1990b)

behavior
Punishment

Claim

40

Extreme behavior increases

(Marx, 1974)

government punishment

Likelihood to

Claim

41

Trigger Anti-

Extreme behavior causes negative

(Forsyth,

emotions among members

1990a)

Anti-category emotion reduces group

(Forsyth,

violating behavior

1990a;

category Norm
Emotion
Group Violating

Claim

Behavior

42

1990b)

Causal-Loop Diagram
Dynamic hypothesises are depicted by using the CLD method to capture the logical
relationships between norm emergence variables. The CLD shapes reinforcing loops (R1- R17)
and balancing loops (B1-B11). Reinforcing and balancing loops respectively cause positive and
negative effects. Each loop starts at a variable and moves forward in the direction which leads
back to the starting variable. Figure 9. shows the cause-effect relationships between variables for
norm emergence based on the social identity theory and the claims and assumptions table.
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Figure 9. Causal Loop Diagram
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Loops’ Legend
Each of the causal loops below shows one portion of the original causal diagram which can
be used both for the explanatory purposes and structural validation.15

Personal Values +

Contesting/New +
Norm

Group Behavior
+

Strengthening
Personal Values

R1

+
Personal Norm

+ Pro-Group
Emotion

+ Risk Taking

Figure 10. Strengthening Personal Values

Strengthening Personal values, R1(Dechesne et al., 2011; Forsyth, 1990; Mercer, 2014; Turner et
al., 1987; Vickers, 1973). Personal values shape personal norms—the stronger the personal
norm, the more individuals perceive the pro-group emotion. The more pro-group emotion
resulted in more risk taking and, as a result, more group violating behavior. The more violators
behave and practice the norm the greater number of people adopt the new norm and in
consequence it strengthens the personal values.

15

I will explain structural validation in detail in the simulation chapter.
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-

Doing Dissimilarity
Focused Comparison
+

Violators Group
Formation

Declining Violators
Group

B1

Emergence of Distrust
Toward Group Norm

Likelihood of Defining
Incompatible Goals

+

Figure 11. Declining Violators Group

Declining Violators Group, B1(Posten & Mussweiler, 2013). Violators might find that their
goals differ from a violators group and that triggers distrust toward group goals and norms. More
distrust causes more dissimilarity focused compression, which in turns weaken the violators
group.
Perceiving Similarity Halt, B2 (Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Turner, 1985; Turner & Reynolds,
2011; Turner, Reynolds, Haslam, & Veenstra, 2006; Villatoro, Sen, & Sabater-Mir, 2010; Yang,
2000). Perception of Similarity resulted in violators group formation which resulted in
government punishment. Punishment reduces the Group Behavior and as a result it decreases the
Pro-Group Emotion which later affect the Perception of Similarity.
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Pro-Group
Emotion +

Group Behavior
-

+
Perceiving Similarity
Based on Shared Interest

Perceiving
Similarity Halt

B2

+ Punishment
+ Violators Group
Formation

Figure 12. Perceiving Similarity Halt

Group Behavior

Pro-Group
Emotion +

+
Perceiving Similarity
Based on Shared Interest

+

Risk Taking
R2

Promoting
Perceiving Similarity

+

Likelihood of
Feeling Angry
+ Violators Group
Formation

+ Punishment

Figure 13. Promoting Perceiving Similarity

Promoting Perceiving Similarity, R2 (Campos-Vazquez & Cuilty, 2014; Posner & Rasmusen,
1999; Turner, 1985; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Turner et al., 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992;
Villatoro et al., 2010; Yang, 2000). Perception of Similarity resulted in Violators Group
Formation which in turn triggers government’s punishment. Punishment increases feeling of
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angriness. As a result, people take more risk and that increases Group Behavior. More Group
Behavior increases the Pro-Group Emotion which later strengthens the perception of similarity.

Pro-Group
Emotion +

Group Behavior
+
Risk Taking
-

+
Perception of Similarity
Based on Shared Interest

B3

Reducing Perception
of Similarity
Feeling of Fear
+

+ Violators Group
Formation

+ Punishment

Figure 14. Reducing Perception of Similarity

Reducing Perception of Similarity, B3 (Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Turner, 1985; Turner &
Reynolds, 2011; Turner et al., 2006; Villatoro et al., 2010; Wake et al., 2020; Yang, 2000).
Perception of Similarity resulted in Violators Group Formation which in turn triggers
government’s punishment. Punishment increases Feeling of Fear. As a result, people take less
risk and that decreases Group Behavior. Less Group Behavior reduces the Pro-Group Emotion
which later weaken the perception of similarity.
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Group Behavior

Pro-Group +
Emotion

+
Internalization of
the Norm
R3

+
Perception of Similarity
Based on Shared Interest

+ Violators Group
Formation

Increasing Perception
of Similarity

+

Depersonalization &
+ Self-Stereotyping
+ Learn & Assign
Group Norm

Figure 15. Increasing Perception of Similarity

Increasing Perception of Similarity, R3 (Turner, 1985; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Turner et al.,
2006; Yang, 2000). Perception of Similarity resulted in Violators Group Formation which in turn
caused a greater number of people to learn and assign a new norm. That resulted in a greater
number of people who self-stereotype and depersonalize and in consequence internalize the
norm. Internalization of the Norm increases Group Behavior and, as a result, the Pro-Group
Emotion which later increased the perception of similarity.
Less Perception of Similarity, B4 (Dechesne et al., 2011; Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Turner,
1985; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Turner et al., 2006; Vickers, 1973; Villatoro et al., 2010).
Personal Values shape Personal Norm and Personal Norm shapes Personal Identity. The stronger
personal identity is the more individuals perceive the similarity and join the violators group
which in turn triggers government punishment. Government punishment reduces Group
Behavior. Thus, it weakens the Contesting/New Norm and, in consequence, Personal Values.
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Personal Values

+

Contesting/New
Norm
+
Group Behavior

+
Personal Norm
B4

Less Perception of
Similarity

-

+
+Punishment

Personal Identity
+

Perception of Similarity
Based on Shared Interest

+

Violators Group
Formation

Figure 16. Less Perception of Similarity

Personal Norm +

Personal Values

+

Contesting/New
+
Norm
Group Behavior
-

+
Pro-Group
Emotion

Similarity
Obstacle

B5
+Punishment

+ Perception of Similarity
Based on Shared Interest

+ Violators Group
Formation

Figure 17. Similarity Obstacle

Similarity Obstacle, B5 (Dechesne et al., 2011; Mercer, 2014; Posner & Rasmusen, 1999;
Turner, 1985; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Turner et al., 2006; Vickers, 1973; Villatoro et al.,
2010). Personal Values shape Personal Norm and Personal Norm shapes Pro-Group Emotion.
The stronger Pro-Group Emotion is the more individuals perceive the similarity and join the
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violators group which in turn triggers government punishment. Government punishments reduce
Group Behavior. Thus, it weakens the Contesting/New Norm and, in consequence, Personal
Values.

Personal Norm +

Personal Values

+
Personal Identity
B6

Dominant/Old
Norm
-

-

Reduction of
Similarity

Contesting/New
Norm
+

+
Perception of Similarity
Based on Shared Interest
+ Violators Group
Formation

+ Punishment

- Group Behavior

Figure 18. Reduction of Similarity

Reduction of Similarity, B6 (Dechesne et al., 2011; Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Turner, 1985;
Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Turner et al., 2006; Vickers, 1973; Villatoro et al., 2010). Personal
Values shape Personal Norms and Personal Norms shape Personal Identity. The stronger the
Personal Identity is the more individuals perceive the similarity and join the violators group
which, in turn, triggers government punishment. Government punishments reduces Group
Behavior; thus, it weakens the Contesting/New Norm. The weaker the new norm is the stronger
the old norm is, which weakens Personal Values.
Pro-Group Emotion Halt, B7 (Dechesne et al., 2011; Mercer, 2014; Posner & Rasmusen, 1999;
Vickers, 1973; Villatoro et al., 2010). (Turner & Reynolds, 2011). Personal Values shape
Personal Norms and Personal Norms shape Pro-Group Emotion. The stronger the Pro-Group
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Emotion is the more individuals perceive the similarity and join the violators group which, in
turn, triggers government punishment. Government punishment reduces Group Behavior; thus, it
weakens the Contesting/New Norm. The weaker the new norm is the stronger the old norm and
that weakens Personal Values.

Contesting/New
Norm
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Norm

Personal Values -

+
Personal Norm

Group Behavior

Pro-Group
Emotion Halt

B7

-

+
Pro-Group
Emotion

+

+Punishment
+

Perception of Similarity
Based on Shared Interest

+ Violators Group
Formation

Figure 19. Pro-Group Emotion Halt
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Promoting
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Perception of Similarity
Based on Shared Interest

+

Violators Group
Formation

Figure 20. Promoting Pro-Group Emotion

+ Punishment
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Promoting Pro-group Emotion, R4(Campos-Vazquez & Cuilty, 2014; Dechesne et al., 2011;
Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Vickers,
1973; Villatoro et al., 2010). Personal Values shape Personal Norms and Personal Norms shape
Pro-group Emotion. The stronger the Pro-Group Emotion is the more individuals perceive the
similarity and join the violators group which, in turn, triggers government punishment.
Punishment increases feelings of angriness. As a result, people take more risk and that increases
Group Behavior. The more Group Behavior the greater number of people adopt the new norm,
which later strengthens the Personal Values.

Personal Values +
+
Personal Norm

Contesting/New
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+
Group Behavior
+

+
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R5
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+
Perception of Similarity
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+
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Figure 21. Promoting Personal Identity

Promoting Personal identity, R5(Campos-Vazquez & Cuilty, 2014; Dechesne et al., 2011; Posner
& Rasmusen, 1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Vickers, 1973;
Villatoro et al., 2010). Personal Values shape Personal Norms and Personal Norms shape
Personal Identity. The stronger Personal Identity is, the more individuals perceive the similarity
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and join the violators group which, in turn, triggers government punishment. Punishment
increases feelings of angriness. As a result, people take more risks and that increases Group
Behavior. The more Group Behavior the greater number of people adopt the new norm, which
later strengthens the Personal Values.
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Personal Values +

+

Group Behavior

+

+
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-

Personal
Identity Halt

+

Feeling of Fear
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+

+
Perception of Similarity
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+ Violators Group

+ Punishment

Formation
Figure 22. Personal Identity Halt

Personal Identity Halt, B8 (Campos-Vazquez & Cuilty, 2014; Dechesne et al., 2011; Posner &
Rasmusen, 1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Vickers, 1973;
Villatoro et al., 2010). Personal Values shape Personal Norms and Personal Norms shape
Personal Identity. The stronger Personal Identity is, the more individuals perceive the similarity
and join the violators group which, in turn, triggers government punishment. Punishment
increases Feeling of Fear. As a result, people take fewer risks and that decreases Group
Behavior. The less Group Behavior, the fewer number of people adopt the new norm, which later
weakens the Personal Values.
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+
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-
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+

Feeling of Fear

Pro-Group Emotion

+

+
Perception of Similarity
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Formation
Figure 23. Personal Norm Halt

+ Punishment

Personal Norm Halt, B9 (Campos-Vazquez & Cuilty, 2014; Dechesne et al., 2011; Posner &
Rasmusen, 1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Vickers, 1973;
Villatoro et al., 2010). Personal Values shape Personal Norms and Personal Norms shape ProGroup Emotion. The stronger Pro-Group Emotion is, the more individuals perceive the similarity
and join the violators group which, in turn, triggers government punishment. Punishment
increases Feeling of Fear. As a result, people take fewer risks and that decreases Group
Behavior. The less Group Behavior the fewer number of people adopt the new norm, which later
weakens the Personal Values.
Promoting Personal Norm, R6 (Mercer, 2014; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Turner et al., 2006).
Personal Values shape Personal Norms and Personal Norms shapes Pro-Group Emotion. The
stronger Pro-Group Emotion is the more individuals perceive the similarity and join the violators
group which, in turn, causes a greater number of people to learn and assign a new norm. That
results in a greater number of people who self-stereotype and depersonalize and therefore
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internalize the norm. Internalization of the Norm increases Group Behavior and, as a result, a
greater population adopts the new norm and that strengthens the Personal Value.
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Figure 24. Promoting Personal Norm

Increasing Group Behavior, R7 (Mercer, 2014; Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 2006). Personal
Values shape Personal Norms and Personal Norms shape Personal Identity. The stronger
Personal Identity is, the more individuals perceive the similarity and join the violators group
which, in turn, causes a greater number of people to learn and assign a new norm. That results in
a greater number of people who self-stereotype and depersonalize and therefore internalize the
norm. Internalization of the Norm increases Group Behavior and in consequence a greater
population adopts the new norm and that strengthens the Personal Value.
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Figure 25. Increasing Group Behavior
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Figure 26. Increasing Angriness

Increasing Angriness, R8 (Campos-Vazquez & Cuilty, 2014; Dechesne, Di Tosto, Dignum, &
Dignum, 2013; Posner & Rasmusen, 1999; Turner, 1985; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992; Villatoro et al., 2010). Personal Values shape Personal Norms and Personal
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Norms shape Pro-Group Emotion. The stronger Pro-Group Emotion is, the more individuals
perceive the similarity and join the violators group which, in turn, triggers government
punishment. Punishment increases feeling of angriness. As a result, people take more risks and
that increases Group Behavior. More Group Behavior causes a greater number of people to adopt
the new norm, which later weakens the old norm and strengthens the Personal Values.
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Figure 27. Increasing Risk Taking

Increasing Risk Taking, R9 (Campos-Vazquez & Cuilty, 2014; Dechesne et al., 2011; Posner &
Rasmusen, 1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Vickers, 1973;
Villatoro et al., 2010). Personal Values shape Personal Norms and Personal Norms shape
Personal Identity. The stronger Personal Identity is the more individuals perceive the similarity
and join the violators group which, in turn, triggers government punishment. Punishment
increases feelings of angriness. As a result, people take more risks and that increases Group
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Behavior. Increased Group Behavior results in a greater number of people adopting the new
norm, which later decreases the old norm followers and strengthens the Personal Values.
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Figure 28. Reducing Risk Taking

Reducing Risk Taking, B10 (Campos-Vazquez & Cuilty, 2014; Dechesne et al., 2011; Turner &
Reynolds, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Vickers, 1973; Villatoro et al., 2010). Personal
Values shape Personal Norms and Personal Norms shape Pro-Group Emotion. The stronger ProGroup Emotion is, the more individuals perceive the similarity and join the violators group
which, in turn, triggers government punishment. Punishment increases Feeling of Fear. As a
result, people take fewer risks and that decreases Group Behavior. The less Group Behavior the
fewer number of people adopt the new norm which later both strengthens the old norm and
weakens the Personal Values.
Promoting Depersonalization, R10 (Mercer, 2014; Turner, 1985; Turner & Reynolds, 2011).
Personal Values shape Personal Norm and Personal Norm shapes Pro-Group Emotion. The
stronger Pro-Group Emotion is, the more individuals perceive the similarity and join the
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violators group which, in turn, causes a greater number of people to learn and assign a new norm.
That results in a greater number of people who self-stereotype and depersonalize and therefore
internalize the norm. Internalization of the New Norm increases Group Behavior and in
consequence a greater population adopts the new norm and that weakens the old norm and
strengthens Personal Value.
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Figure 29. Promoting Depersonalization

Promoting Self-Stereotyping, R11 (Mercer, 2014; Turner, 1985; Turner & Reynolds, 2011;
Turner et al., 2006). Personal Values shape Personal Norms and Personal Norms shape Personal
Identity. The stronger Personal Identity is, the more individuals perceive the similarity and join
the violators group which, in turn, causes a greater number of people to learn and assign a new
norm. That results in a greater number of people who self-stereotype and depersonalize and
therefore internalize the norm. Internalization of the New Norm increases Group Behavior and in

79

consequence a greater population adopts the new norm and that weakens the old norm and
strengthens Personal Value.
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Figure 30. Promoting Self-Stereotyping

Group Behavior Promotion, R12 (Forsyth, 1990). The stronger the Contesting/New Norm is, the
less Peer-Pressure is perceived by violators which, in turn, increases Risk Taking. More RiskTaking results in more Group Behavior and in consequence stronger Contesting/New Norm.
New Norm Promotion, R13 (Forsyth, 1990). The stronger the Contesting/New Norm is, the
weaker the Dominant/Old Norm is and, thus, less Peer-Pressure is perceived by violators which,
in turn, increases Risk Taking. More Risk Taking results in more Group Behavior and in
consequence stronger Contesting/New Norm.
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Figure 31. Group Behavior Promotion
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+
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Figure 33. Increasing Contestation

Increasing Contestation, R14(Campos-Vazquez & Cuilty, 2014; Forsyth, 1990; Nguyen &
Noussair, 2014; Yang, 2000). The more Pro-Group Emotion, the more individuals take risks and,
as a result, that increases violation of Group Behavior which, in turn, strengthens Pro-Group
Emotion.
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Figure 34. Promoting New Behavior
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Promoting New Behavior, R15 (Forsyth, 1990). The stronger the Contesting/New Norm is, the
less Peer Pressure is perceived by violators which, in turn, increases Risk Taking. More RiskTaking results in more Group Behavior and, in consequence, stronger Contesting/New Norm.
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Figure 35. Declining Old Behavior

Declining Old Behavior, R16 (Forsyth, 1990). The stronger the Contesting/New Norm is, the
less Peer-Pressure is perceived by violators which, in turn, increases Risk Taking. More RiskTaking results in more Group Behavior and, in consequence, stronger Contesting/New Norm and
weaker Dominant/Old Norm.
Increasing Contesting Norm, R17(Dechesne et al., 2011; Forsyth, 1990; Mercer, 2014; Turner et
al., 1987; Vickers, 1973). Personal Values shape Personal Norm. The stronger Personal Norm is
the more individuals perceive the Pro-Group Emotion. More Pro-Group Emotion results in more
Risk Taking and, as a result, more Group Violating Behavior. The more violators practice the
new norm the greater number of people adopt the new norm and in this strengthens Personal
Values.
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Figure 36. Increasing Contesting Norm
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Figure 37. Norm Rivalry

Norm Rivalry, B11. Dominant/Old Norm competes with the Contesting/New Norm.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I describe social identity theory, which is the foundation for the conceptual
model. I provide the conceptual model or dynamic hypothesis as 42 claims and assumptions.
And to depict the logical relationships between norm emergence variables I use CLDs. For the
purposes of both clarity and structural verification, I explain each loop separately: in total there
were 12 balancing loops and 17 reinforcing loops. New contributions to knowledge emerged
through this process which are depicted in Figure 13. (Promoting Perceiving Similarity), which
is loop R2, and Figure 27. (Increasing Risk Taking) which is loop R9. Based on loop R2, ProGroup Emotion resulted in perception of similarity and later Violators Group Formation.
However, as expected, government punishment of those violators increases angriness. Feeling of
angriness increases Risk Taking and more violating actions. The more violating actions indeed
intensified Pro-Group Emotion, a perception of similarity among the group. In another way, as
loop R9 shows, angriness due to government punishment resulted in more Group Behavior and,
as a result, increased the number of new norm followers. Thus, punishment may, depending upon
the magnitude of these effects, play the role of an accelerator in those cases rather a prohibitor.
Although this qualitative model provides us valuable insight regarding the research questions, to
get deeper insight and more details a simulation model is needed. In the following chapter, I will
explain the simulation model structure in detail.
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SIMULATION MODEL

Introduction
In the previous chapter I discussed the conceptual model, which is based on existing
theories in the literature and provides the logic and reference for the dynamic hypothesis. To
implement the conceptual model, I use a system dynamic modeling approach. The simulation
model is built in Vensim. In this chapter, I will explain the simulation model’s structure. To do
so I start by explaining the overview of the model. After that, I divide the model in several sub
models and discuss all variables and parameters in detail including their description, their units,
and equations for both clarity and reproducibility.16 Finally, I discuss several tests which need to
be run to ensure that the model’s behavior and structure are valid. To explain the model’s
structure, I combine the guidelines to report a simulation-based model in social science
(Rahmandad & Sterman, 2012) with examples from the literature (Pierson & Sterman, 2013).
Telling the Story of Contesting Norm Emergence
When a person or a few people who believe in a new norm begin to contest the harmful
old norm—to not only show their opposition but to draw attention to the problem—it is hard for
other members of the society, who have a shared interest with those violators, to not join them.
As a result, movement from the old norm begins toward the new norm with an increasing
number of people joining the violators group. However, these people have not fully denied the
old norm and there is a likelihood that they may find that the old norm fulfills their interest better
and so return to the general population. The next step in moving toward a new norm is to have
violators internalize the new norm through education. Because it is true that they do not believe

16

Reproducibility is to provide enough information for other researchers in case if they want to reproduce this model.
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in the old norm, but they still do not believe in any other norm, they are a population which
might be convinced to follow other norms. The increase in the number of people who internalize
the norm means the society faces more violations of the old norm. But violating the old norm is
harder and riskier at the early stages of a collective behavior change due to both government
punishment and peer punishment. People are likely to be afraid they will lose their job, life,
reputation, and even their friends and family. With time and as the violating behavior persists, a
new norm gains more popularity. This shift in the population makes risk taking more easier and,
in consequence, the violating behavior happens more openly until the new norm eventually gains
sufficient followers to have enough power to change the old norm through institutions.
Nevertheless, this new norm itself is always in danger of being challenged, weakened, and
replaced by another norm when people find that norm fulfills their goals and interests better. This
is the brief story of the stock and flow model but it is important to remember that emergence of a
new norm is not the only story that I can tell, and there is a possibility that it does not emerge due
to structural resistance and lack of resources like educational resources. I will talk about those
factors in detail in the following chapters.
Model Structure
The simulation model has been built around four main population stocks, which in sum
are equal to the total population of the society. Figure 38. shows these stocks and respective
flows. Each of these four stocks represent one state of population which can transfer to another.
In other words, stocks respectively change from old norm populations to violator group
populations, to populations that internalized the new norm, to new norm followers’ populations,
to any of the other states. In this study, I assume that when the new norm population reaches
most of the total population, public opinion will affect the institutions capable of changing the
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harmful norm. This assumption has its root in constructivists’ claim that people’s value and
opinions have a direct influence on government officials and their policies (Sjöstedt 2007). By
studying people’s opinions, I should be able to make predictions about government behavior.
After talking to the subject matter expert in the field, I consider a 100-year window of time to see
if this transition would happen.
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potential population to violate the old norm. I assume that a portion of this population, by seeing
initial violator actions, perceived the similarity due to common interests and therefore joined the
violators.
Dominant Norm Population = INTEG ("Stage 3. Dissimilarity Rate"-Transfer Rate, Total
Population*P1)
INTEG show that this is a stock variable and the amount after the comma is the initial value for
this stock. Total population is a constant and it is the population of the target society. P1 is the
percent of the population that follows the old norm. Thus, initial value is equal to total
population * P1.
Violators Group Population: The Violators Group Population is the portion of the total
population that perceives that they are similar to the initial violators and categorize themselves as
violators, but still are not completely familiar with the norm and goal of the group. They still
need to learn, assign, and internalize the new norm. The people in this population are not yet true
believers in the new norm, so there is a likelihood that some of them may perceive it as an
incompatible goal and experience dissimilarity with the group and therefore become detached
from it. P2 is the percent of the population that violates the old norm. Thus, the initial value for
this stock is equal to total population * P2.
Violators Group Population = INTEG (Transfer Rate-"Stage 3. Internalization Rate""Stage 3. Dissimilarity Rate", Total Population*P2)
Internalized the Contesting Norm Population: The portion of the total population that
internalize the new norm and truly believe in it. P3 is the percent of the population that
internalizes the new norm. Thus, initial value for this stock is equal to total population * P3.
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Internalized the Contesting Norm Population = INTEG ("Stage 3. Internalization Rate"Emergence of Contesting Normative Context Rate, Total Population * P3)
New Norm Population:18 The portion of the total population that follows and believes in
the new norm. Finally, when the internalized population—including those who did not behave
based on the new norm before—start doing so, they transfer to the new norm population. P4 is
the percent of the population that behaves according to the new norm. Thus, initial value for this
stock is equal to total population * P4.
New Norm Population = INTEG (Emergence of Contesting Normative Context Rate-Exit
Rate, Total Population * P4)
The main five flows among these stocks as shown in Figure 38. are: (1) “Transfer Rate,” which
shows the change in the population that transfers from the old norm to the violators population
based on the perception of similarity. This perception of similarity, as discussed in the
conceptual model chapter, has its root in people’s shared interest. (2) “Stage 3. Dissimilarity
Rate,” which shows the change in the population of those who transfer from the violators
population to the old norm population. This happens due to a perception of dissimilarity and
distrust toward the group norm. (3) “Stage 3. Internalization Rate,” which shows the change in
population of those who transfer from the violators population to the next stock, which is the
population that has internalized the contesting norm. (4) “Emergence of Contesting Normative
Context Rate,” which shows the change in the population of those who transfer from the
internalized population toward the new norm population. (5) “Exit Rate,” which shows the
change in population of those who transfer from the new norm population into another norm or

18

It should be noted that we use new norm and contesting norm interchangeably.
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back to the old norm.19 Having discussed the model’s major stocks and flows, I will now briefly
explain the five sub models that drive the model. The first sub model is “Perception of
Similarity,” which shows the dynamic process and main driving factor behind the population
transfer from old norm to violators group. The second sub model is called “Perception of
Dissimilarity,” which shows the main reason some portion of the violators population goes back
to the old norm. “New Norm Internalization” is the third sub model and is focused on the process
needed for violators in the New Norm Population to internalize the norm. The fourth sub model
is “Emergence of New Norm,” which explains the actions needed for the new norm believers to
turn the new norm into a normative behavior of the society. Finally, the fifth sub model is “Exit
from the New Norm,” which shows the population that leaves a new norm population.
To build the model and its five sub models, I use several auxiliary and constant variables such as
Time Delay, Look Up Function,20 Firsthand control, and STEP function. Next, I discuss each of
the sub models in detail.
Sub-Model 1: “Perception of Similarity”
As I discussed earlier, the main element that affects transfer rate from the old population
to the violators population is perception of similarity. Figure 39. shows the overview of this sub
model.
Perception of Similarity: People perceive similarity based on their shared interests which
could be many different things such as their job, gender, grievance, and many others. I define
perception of similarity below:

19

Exit Rate represents people who change their mind and no longer believe in the new norm when they find the new
norm does not fulfill their interests anymore. This population might decide to go back to any of the stock (i.e. old
norm population or violators population), but study of that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
20
Look up function or graphical function shows the non-established mathematical relations between variables.
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Perception of Similarity: SMOOTH (MAX (“Pro-Category Emotion” + Personal Identity, 0), AT
Similarity)
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Figure 39. Sub Model 1: Perception of Similarity
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There are several auxiliary variables: Pro-Category Emotion, First Violation, Personal
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Norm, Personal Identity, and Personal Values. The look up functions consist of Effect of Group
on Anger
Violating Behavior on Pro-Category Emotion; Effect of Old to New Norm Ratio on Personal

Feeling of A
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Values; and Perception of Similarity. In what follows I explain each of them in detail.
Pro-Category Emotion: This variable has a positive effect on the perception of similarity
rate. However, this variable itself is affected by three other factors: (1) Personal Norm shapes
both Personal Identity and Pro-Category-Emotion. As a result, those who accept the new norm
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are in favor of violators; (2) Group Violating Behavior also has impact on Pro-Category
Emotion. When we observe that our family and relatives are involved in some behavior, it
awakens our emotions toward the group. And, last is; (3) First Violation, which triggers the
observer’s emotion and in consequence results in perception of similarity based on shared
interest.
"Pro-Category Emotion" = SMOOTH ((Personal Norm * “Effect of Group Violating
Behaviors on Pro-Category Emotion”) + First Violation, "AT for Pro-Category Emotion")
First Violation: This variable represents the effect of initial violation on perception of
similarity. Figure 40. shows how this function affects the relative variables. I represent first
violation by a STEP function as shown below:
First Violation = STEP (0.5, 10)

Figure 40. First Violation and its Effect on Pro-Category Emotion

That means the function returns zero from time zero until time 10 when the First
Violation occurs. As a result, there is a 0.5 increase in the perception of similarity. In other
words, Pro-Category Emotion is 0 until time 10, then it jumps to 0.5.
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Look Up Similarity: I assumed S-shaped or logistic growth relation between the potential
population that has emotions in favor of violators and perception of similarity, which is shown in
Figure 41. It means as Pro-Category Emotion increases, Perception of Similarity also increases. I
make this assumption based on social identity theory which emphasizes the importance of social
identity and interaction.

Perception of Similarity

1

0

1
Pro-Category Emotion
Figure 41. Look Up Similarity

Effect of Group Violating Behaviour: will be discussed in detail in sub model 4.
Look Up New to Old Population Ratio: This shows the relationship between this ratio and
personal values. In other words, I assume an S-shaped growth relationship between the increase
in new to old norm followers as well as an increase in personal value.
New to Old Population Ratio = New Norm Population/Dominant Norm Population
Personal Value: This variable is a main source of changes between Personal Norm and,
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as a result, to Personal Identity. There are variables such as Personal Values, in the simulation
model that are intangible, and their scale is unknown. To cope with this problem, I use
continuous and dimensionless values between zero and one in which zero and one respectively
represent the “lowest” and the “highest” amounts for these intangible variables: Personal Values,
Norm, and Identity. It means the minimum amount for those variables are zero and their value
cannot exceed one.
Personal Value = SMOOTH (New to Old Population Ratio, AT for Value)
Personal Norm, which is shown in Figure 42., changes because of changes in Personal Values. I
define it as:
Personal Norm = SMOOTH (Personal Values, AT for Norm)
Similarly, Personal Identity changes due to changes in Personal Norm. This means the amount of
Personal Identity will change by the same amount as Personal Norm through AT for Identity.
Personal Identity = SMOOTH (Personal Norm, AT for Identity)

Figure 42. Changes in Personal Values and Personal Norm through Time
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At this point, I explain all the factors that affect Perception of Similarity. They are
summarized in Table 7. I begin with a discussion of the transfer rate from the Dominant Norm
Popluation to the Violaters Group Population.
Transfer Rate: Effect of Perception of Similarity on Transfer Rate * Dominant Norm
Population/AT Time to Transfer
AT time to transfer is the time needed for all tangible and non-tangible materials to transfer.
Time Delay: “Time delay is nature’s way of keeping everything from happening at once.”21
Every real system has time delay; a time lags between when something occurs and when
impact of that change is felt. Time delays play a crucial role when a dynamic system is modeled.
There exist two types of time delay. One of them is a material delay (conserved or tangible stuff)
such as number of people, and the second is a non-conserved delay (intangible or information
delay) like the time that is needed to feel anger. I will discuss material delays in this section.
Non-conserved delays will be discussed in the next section.
Material Delays: The amount of time it takes for transiting material, such as a car created
a factory or a population that goes from one stock to another. The outflow can be calculated as
the amount of material in transit divided by the delay. In other words, the longer the time delay,
the less the out flow will be. This is represented by the below formula: Outflow = Material in
Transit/Time Delay. In this model the out flow from Old Norm Population is the transfer rate.
The material in transit is Effect of Perception of Similarity on Transfer Rate * Dominant Norm
Population and the time delay is defined as AT to Transfer.

21

This quote is attributed to Albert Einstein and John Archibald Wheeler (but not both at the same time).
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Table 7. Summary of Variables and Parameters for Sub-Model 1
Variables

Description

Type

Unit

Dominant/Old Norm

People who believe in the old norm

Stock

Person

Change in number of people who perceive the

Rate

Person/Year

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Population
Transfer Rate

similarity
First Violation

This shows the effect of first people or group
of people, who observe that the old norm is
harmful and violate it, on pro violation
emotion

"Pro-Category Emotion"

It shows when emotion is in favor of the
violators group

Look Up Similarity

This graphical function shows how an increase
in the Pro-Category Emotion causes an
increase in Perception of Similarity

Lookup Group Violating

This graphical function shows how an increase

Behaviors on Pro Emotion

in group members’ violating behavior leads to
an increase of emotion in favor of the group

Personal Value

This stock shows the value change among the
population

Personal Norm

Affected by value, this stock shows the norm
change among the population

Personal Identity

Affected by norm, this stock shows the
identity change among the population

Perception of Similarity

The stock shows the change of perceiving
similar interest among population to join the
violators
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Sub-Models 2 & 3: “Perception of Dissimilarity” and “New Norm Internalization”
Sub models 2 and 3 will be discussed together because they have a very similar process
called stage three information delay. As is clear from the Figure 43. the violators population can
learn a new norm and then decide what to do. One possibility is that they define the new norm as
an incompatible goal and lose trust in the norm after doing dissimilarity analysis, which result in
going back to the old norm. Sub-model 2 addresses this possibility. Sub-model 3 addresses the
other option which is that those who adopt the new norm later internalize it.
Information Delays: A kind of the time delay broadly used in modeling human behavior
(Sterman, 2000). It conveys the transition time that humans need to process information and
change from one mental state into another. This concept can be several step/stage structures in
which each stage is shown by a stock variable. Information delays begin with one mental state as
an input which transitions through multiple stages. For example, from stage one, learning and
assigning the new norm, into stage two, self-stereotyping, and, finally, stage three, internalization
of the results in the final mindset as an output. The delay in transitioning from one stage into the
next is equal to the adjustment time (AT) divided by the total number of stages, which means
transitions happen faster when AT is shorter. Conversely, as the number of stocks increases, the
information delay is composed of more stages, and, in consequence, the total delay in changing
from the initial mental state into the last one is longer.
Figure 43. depicts a third order information delay structure. That means there are three
stages that the initial input must go through until it gets to the last transition, which results in the
output. This structure depicts human transitions from stage.1 learning and assigning new norm to
stage.2 depersonalization to stage.3 internalization of that norm. As people categorize themselves
into a new category, they start learning and assigning the new norm. This results in self-
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stereotyping and depersonalization. Finally, after people depersonalize themselves, they start to
internalize the norm.
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alternative outcome— when they internalize the norm (the output of the third order delay) and
become part of the Contesting Norm Population. The rates of increase at each step of the
structure in sub-models two and three follow the below formulas:
Rate of Increase in Stage 1 = (Input – Stage 1 Stock)/(AT/3)
Rate of Increase in Stage 2 = (Stage 1 Stock – Stage 2 Stock)/(AT/3)
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Rate of Increase in Stage 3 = (Stage 2 Stock – Stage 3 Stock)/(AT/3)
In general, the rate can be calculated as an input into whatever affects the rate, which could be a
stock or any other auxiliary variable, minus the output, which is always a stock, divided by the
time delay—here Adjusted Time to Internalization (AT). And as it is a third order delay it is also
divided by 3. The input for each stock is the output of the previous stage and the stocks increase
until they achieve an equal level as their input. Thus, for the model I can calculate the delays for
each stage as:
“Stage 1. Adapting Rate" = (Potential Population Learning-Learning and Assigning Norm)/
(AT to Internalization / 3)
“Stage 2. Increase in Collective Belief” = (Learning and Assigning Norm“Depersonalization and Self-Stereotyping”) / (AT to Internalization / 3)
“Stage 3. Internalization Rate” = (“Depersonalization and Self-Stereotyping”-Internalized
the Contesting Norm Population) / (AT to Internalization / 3)
Now I discuss the components of each stage in detail, starting with stage one. The two
other stages will follow with the exact same logic.
The input for “Stage 1. Adapting Rate” is Potential Population that learns the new norm.
`Potential Population that Learns the New Norm: This is an auxiliary variable which shows the
number of people who are learning the new norm. This variable depends on the Learning
Coefficient (LC) and Violators Group Population
Potential Population that Learns = Learning Coefficient * Violators Group Population
Learning Coefficient: This parameter is a cultural one. In other words, for democratic and
loose cultures the learning coefficient is higher. Usually there is more freedom of speech and
social media are more available in comparison to non-democratic cultures where these are
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sometimes filtered. This parameter affects the availability of resources to learn a new norm.
Thus, I assume two different LC across cultures (70-30). I do not assign 100 percent even in the
democratic culture because sometimes some people might violate the old norm. However, they
may not like the new group norm nor the old norm. This group remains violators, but do not join
the new norm population. As Hooks (1990) mentioned, one of the main obstacles for a
successful norm transition is the lack of a shared collective identity which has its root in a shared
group norm. I show this obstacle by two means. First, not all the population learns the norm (LC)
and secondly there is a likelihood that some of them perceive incompatible goal.
In the simulation model, there is a similar information delay in sub-model 2. The structure
and logic behind it is just as similar as sub-model 3 and to avoid redundancy I only write the
equation Model 2, which can be formulated as below:
“Stage 1. Increase Rate” = (Potential Population that Perceived-Perceived Incompatible
Goal)/ (AT to Dissimilarity / 3)
“Stage 2. Distrust Increase Rate” = (Perceived Incompatible Goal-Emergence of Distrust
Toward Category Norms) / (AT to Dissimilarity / 3)
“Stage 3. Dissimilarity Rate” = Emergence of Distrust Toward Category Norms/ (AT to
Dissimilarity / 3)
The input for “Stage 1. Increase Rate” is Potential Population that Perceived Incompatible
Goal.
Potential Population that Perceived Incompatible Goal: This is an auxiliary variable
which shows the number of people who realize their interests and goals are different from the
group. This variable depends on the potential population that perceived dissimilarity with the
group norm and goals.
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Potential Population that Perceived Incompatible Goal = Violators Group Population *
Percentage of Dissimilarity
Percentage of Dissimilarity: This is another constant parameter which happens due to
perceiving different interests and goals from the group norm and finding that the old norm is more
beneficial. Table 8. shows the summary of all variables and parameters for this section.

Variables

Table 8. Summary of Variables and Parameters for Sub-Models 2 & 3
Description
Type

"Depersonalization and Self-

This stock shows population that

Stereotyping"

is depersonalized.

Learning and Assigning Norm

This stock shows population that

Unit

Stock

Person

Stock

Person

Stock

Person

Stock

Person

Stock

Person

Stock

Person

Stock

Person

Rate

Person/Year

is learning and assigning a new
norm.
Perceived Incompatible Goal

Population that realizes that they
have a different goal and interest
than the group norm

Emergence of Distrust Toward

Having different goal results in

Category Norms

emergence of distrust among
group members

Violators Group Population

Population that disobeys a
dominant norm

Internalized the Contesting Norm

Population that internalizes the

Population

norm

New Norm Population

Population that accepts and
behaves based on the new norm

“Stage 1. Adapting Rate”

Change in number of populations
that learn and assign the group
norm
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Table 8. Continued
Variables

Description

Type

Unit

“Stage 1. Increase Rate”

Change in number of populations

Rate

Person/Year

Rate

Person/Year

Rate

Person/Year

Rate

Person/Year

Rate

Person/Year

Auxiliary

Person

Auxiliary

Person

Constant

Person

Constant

Person

that perceive their interests
dissimilar to other members
"Stage 2. Increase in Collective

Change in number of populations

Belief"

that believe in the group norm

“Stage 2. Distrust Increase Rate”

Change in number of populations
that lose their trust in the group
norm

“Stage 3. Internalization Rate”

Change in the number of
populations that internalize the
norm through time

“Stage 3. Dissimilarity Rate"

Change in number of populations
that perceive the dissimilarity

Potential Population Learning the

Those part of the violators

Norm

population that learn the norm

Potential Population that Perceived

Those parts of the violators

Incompatible Goal

population that realize their goals
and interests are different from the
groups

Percentage of Dissimilarity

Percent of violators that, after
learning a group norm, perceive
dissimilarity between their
interests and group interests

Learning Coefficient

Percent of violators that is able
and have access to learn a group
norm

103
Sub-Model 4: “Emergence of New Norm Sub Model”
This section shows model transition from the population that internalizes the new norm
into a population that behaves based on the new norm. Figure 44. depicts this sub-model. As
discussed in the conceptual model, people, after internalizing a norm, start practicing that norm
and after a while the norm becomes a normative behavior of a society. Thus, group violating
behavior and its effect are the main elements which affect this transition.
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Figure 44. Emergence of a New Norm and Exit Sub-Models

Group Violating Behavior is an auxiliary variable which itself depends on several other
variables such as Risk Taking, Effect of Government Punishment, Effect of Peer Punishment,
Anti-Category Emotion, Extreme Behavior Punishment, and Effect of Punishment on Group
Behavior. In what follows I will discuss each of these variables in detail.
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Group Violating Behaviors = ((Risk Taking) / (Extreme Behavior Punishment * “Anti- Category
Emotion” * Effect of Punishments on Group Behavior)) * Behavior Coefficient
Risk Taking This variable has a positive effect on group violating behavior through risky
shift. Its rate depends on two factors: cost and benefit.
Benefit > Cost.
Risk Taking = MIN (Benefit / Cost, 1)
Cost These are Negative Feelings, include the feeling of disgust and/or shame from peers
and the feeling of fear of government punishment, which could be fear of being arrested, losing a
job, or economic loss. These are the two main associated costs that reduce risk taking.
Cost = Negative Feelings
Negative Feelings = SMOOTH (Effect of Fear on Negative Feeling + Effect of Disgust on
Negative Feelings, AT for Feeling)
To show the effect of feelings of fear on Negative Feelings, I use a look-up function which
shows the relationship between the population that violates the norm and government punishment.
Effect of Fear on Negative Feeling = SMOOTH (Look Up Fear (Contesters to Old Ratio), AT for
Fear)
Effect of Government Punishment: This look-up function shows the punishment that is
executed by the government to suppress norm violators. It is the ratio of new to old norm
populations. I define it this way and assume that governments gain their power from their
supporters’ populations. Therefore, as the number of their supporters/followers decreases
compared to the number of contesters in the population, they have less power to punish norm
violators. This function has been built on a historical reference mode of protest. The look up for
government punishment explains that when the number of violators is insignificant, the
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government has tolerance and does not really show any serious reaction. But, as the number goes
up, the government punishment increases until the point when the majority of the population
contests. Government punishment ceases when the contested norm is acknowledged.
Effect of Peer Punishment: To show how peer pressure affects violators, I define it as a
look up. This function shows the feeling of disgust that norm violators bear among their
community, which is the number of new norm adaptors who are disobedient and lose their
reputation. This look-up function, shown in Figure 45. is built based on the existing reference
mode for peer-pressure sanctions in the literature (Helbing, Yu, Opp, & Rauhut, 2014). That
means the peer-pressure punishment is at the highest level when the majority of the peers do not
accept the norm. It then decreases since the number of norm adopters (peers) increases through
time.
New to Old Norm Population Ratio

Peer Punishment

1

0

1
Figure 45. Look-Up Peer Punishment

Feeling of Disgust, due to peer punishment, has a direct relationship with Negative
Feelings, which in turn increases the cost of Risk Taking.
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Feeling of Disgust = SMOOTH (Peer Punishment (New to Old Population Ratio) * Maximum
Effect, AT for Disgust)
Benefit: This is composed of Positive Feelings which increase Risk Taking, such as
feelings of anger due to unjustified government punishment of violators. In other words, when
the government punishes norm violators, others feel angry because they perceive that
punishment as illegitimate. This results in angriness and more risk taking. An example of this
was the “Inn Riot” protest which occurred during the LGBTQ movement when government
punishment triggered more anger and more norm violations (Mongiello, 2016). Another variable
which affects benefit is Pro-Category Emotion. This occurs when people who observe violators
perceive a similar interest with them. An example is when the “Girl of Enghelab Street,” acting
as a first violator, unveiled her Hijab. Many after her have done the same because they pursue
the same interest; indeed, they admire her bravery.
Benefit = Positive Feeling
Positive Feeling = SMOOTH3I (“Pro-Category Emotion” * Effect of Anger on Positive Feeling,
AT for Feeling, 0.1)
Anti-Category Emotion: In all collective actions, there is a likelihood that group members
will show extreme behavior. I define it as a likelihood because it might or might not happen. But
when it happens, it will cause an emergence of Anti-Category Emotion and, in consequence, a
decline in the Group Violating Behavior. An example of this is when protestors begin to riot and
break into storefronts, like what recently occurred in Chicago when a Black Lives Matter protest
became violent.
“Anti- Category Emotion” = SMOOTH (Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors due to
Deindividuation, AT for Anti Emotion)
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Extreme Behavior Punishment: Governments usually execute specific forms of
punishment as needed, which I called Extreme Behavior Punishment. This punishment emerges
when violators show extreme behavior and clearly it decreases the Group Violating Behavior.
Extreme Behavior Punishment = SMOOTH (Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors * 1.2, AT for
Punishment)
Effect of Punishment on Group Behavior: Government punishment not only causes
feelings of fear, which affect Risk Taking, but, indeed, when people taking the risk violate a
norm, government executive branches suppress those who take the risk and practice the new
norm. This has a negative effect on Group Violating Behavior.
With all of the varaibles defined, I create the following equation for the Emergence of Contesting
Normative Context Rate.
Emergence of Contesting Normative Context Rate = MIN (Internalized the Contesting Norm
Population, Internalized the Contesting Norm Population * Effect of Group Violating Behaviors
on Emergence of Contesting Normative Context Rate) / AT Time to Emergence of New Norm
Sub Model 5: “Exit from the New Norm”
The final sub model, which is shown in Figure 44. shows that some people, after a while
represented by a time delay, change their minds and left the New Norm Population. This can
occur because the new norm no longer fulfills their interests and/or another norm fits their
interests better. Thus, a percentage of the new norm population that encounters this phenomenon
through time will exit that population.22
Exit Rate = (New Norm Population * Percentage) / Time Delay

22

In this study I do not focus on this process as I am mainly interested in how two competing norms can replace each
other. Thus, I only depict this part as a simple sub model in which a new norm population could change their minds
and go to other stocks such as violators stock or another competing norm. This is one of the limitations of this study.
Future works might study how several competing norms shape the behavior of a society.
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Percentage is a constant parameter. Table 9. shows a summary of all the variables in sub models
four and five.

Table 9. Summary of Variables and Parameters for Sub-Models 4 & 5
Variables

Description

Type

Unit

New Norm Population

Population that accepts and behaves

Stock

Person

Flow

Person/Year

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

based on the new norm
Emergence of Contesting

Change in number of populations

Normative Context Rate

that behave based on the new norm

Group Violating Behaviors

The magnitude in Group Violating
Behavior

Extreme Behavior

Punishment executed by

Punishment

government to suppress extreme
behavior during collective action

Likelihood of Extreme

Likelihood of unacceptable

Behaviors

behavior such as breaking public
goods

Risk Taking

Probability of population risk taking
calculation based on their cost and
benefit

Cost

Shows the violation loss

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Benefit

Shows the violation gain

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Positive Feelings

Feelings that increase the benefit of

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

risk taking
Negative Feelings

Feelings that increase the cost of
risk taking
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Table 6. Continued
Variables

Description

Type

Unit

“Anti-Category Emotion”

The emotion which has its root in

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Auxiliary

Dmnl

Look up

Dmnl

Look up

Dmnl

Look up

Dmnl

Look Up

dmnl

Flow

Person/Year

extreme behavior
Effect of Punishments on

Indicates how punishment causes

Group Behavior

Group Violating Behavior to
decline

Look Up Punishment

The relationship between
Government Punishment and
violators population

Look-Up Anger

Depicts the relationship between
punishment and angriness

Look-Up Fear

Depicts the relationship between
punishment and feeling of fear

Look-Up Group Violating

The effect of Group Violating

Behaviors

Behavior on transferring from
internalize to new norm

Exit Rate

The rate of population change from
new norm to other norms

Model Verification and Validation
Model builders accumulate confidence about a model’s usefulness while building the
model and observing expected behavior. However, model validation is not limited to the model
constructors. It extends to any person who uses the model (Senge & Forrester, 1980). Senge and
Forrester (1980) discuss that to gain common confidence about model usefulness in system
dynamics, the model’s structure and behavior need to be tested. They describe several different
tests and emphasize that based on the model purpose, model builders must select among the
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available tests to evaluate the soundness of their model. Similarly, prior to conducting
experiments, I developed confidence that the simulation model is useful for its intended purpose
through a process of validation. I tested both the structure and behavior of the system. To do so I
perform the following tests.
Model’s Structure Test
Among the tests available to test the structure of a model, I selected the structureverification test, the dimensional-consistency test, and the boundary-adequacy test. To do model
structure verification, I compared it against the conceptual model. This model is a theoretical
one, and all variables in the simulation model and their relationships, which are shown as causal
loops, are derived from existing norm theories (see Chapter 4). No missing variables or CLDs
were found while comparing the conceptual model against the simulation model. Dimensional
consistency and equation formulation were confirmed, and the model runs without error. The
boundary-adequacy test checks for the structure boundary and whether the existing structure is
the most relevant and or includes all the relevant structures to satisfy the purpose of the model. I
checked with a subject matter expert in the field and the model passed this test.
Model’s Behavior Test
To test the model’s behavior, I selected the behavior-reproduction test, the extreme
condition test, and the sensitivity test. One common way to validate a simulation model is to
compare its behavior against the real system’s expected behavior. This study derived expected
behavior from a well-known study by Randers (1973). He shows that the new normative
behavior adaptation occurs as shown in the left side of Figure 46. My model produces output that
is similar to what Randers produces in his study, which is shown in the right side of Figure 46.
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Figure 46. Expected Real System Behavior vs. Model’s Behavior

The second test that I did to check the validity of the system behavior is the extreme
conditioning test. To do so, I test how the system behaves if one sort of population is zero in
comparison with the base run. The results are shown in Figure 47.
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Figure 47. Extreme Condition Testing with One Sort of Population Equal to Zero

I also tested the model behavior to see how it behaves if the initial violation does not
make any change in the society and has no effect on Pro-Category Emotion. I expected nothing
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would happen to the system, as I assume the initial violation is the intervening event that moves
the system forward. The result is shown in Figure 48 below.
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Figure 48. Model Behavior When Initial Violation Makes no Change

The results for extreme testing supports the validity of the model. The model behaves as
expected and it does not break apart.
Finally, I did a sensivity test for all exogenious variables and this test also supported the
validity of the model. After consulting with a subject matter expert I chose 100 years as a
threshold for observing the behavior. Table 10. shows the summary of those tests, while Figures
49, 50, and 51 provide the results for respective variables.
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Table 10. Summary of Sensitivity Tests

Variable

Number of Runs

Range

Results

Learning Coefficient

200 Random Uniform

0.3-0.8

Figure 5.12

Percentage of Dissimilarity

200 Random Uniform

0.02-0.2

Figure 5.13

Likelihood of Extreme Behavior

200 Random Uniform

0.05-0.8

Figure 5.14
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Figure 49. Sensitivity Test for Learning Coefficient on New Norm Population
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Figure 50. Sensitivity Test for Percentage of Dissimilarity on New Norm Population
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Figure 51.Sensitivity Test for Likelihood of Extreme Behavior on New Norm Population
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Conclusion
In this chapter, first I told the story of the model to provide the general overview of the
model. After that, I divided the model into five sub models and discussed each of them in detail
with explanations for all related variables and formulations. Finally, I describe several tests I
conducted to verify that the model functions as conceptualized and ensure that the model is valid
both structurally and behaviorally. Now that I have confidence in the model, I can use it. In the
following chapter, I will discuss the results from running the model and analyze the data
produced.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction
In the previous chapter, I reported the simulation model’s structure and some sensitivity
analyses. This chapter disscusses the simulation’s experiments and some possible scenarios
under which the contesting norm may weaken or change the old norm.
When we talk about norms in a society, we usually expect them to be beneficial for the
society and discourage violence and/or injustice. But we are witnesses that there are harmful and
restrictive norms which are enforced by governments like xenophobia, religious and ethnic
discrimination, and many others that need to be challenged and changed. Clearly, the
government is not inclined to change these laws. Most states accept and respect other states’
sovereignty and follow a non-intervention foreign policy. Therefore, it is not possible for them to
directly challenge another sovereign state’s law. Thus, it is really on residents of a county to
challenge and ideally change restrictive norms. There are examples of successful citizens
contestations. For example, LGBTQ rights in most western countries, abortion laws in Canada,
Ireland, and elsewhere, and refugees’ higher education in Iran. In some instances, these changed
norms have in turn clearly impacted foreign policy, as with the increased emphasis of the state
department on protecting LGBTQ rights globally. These examples support scholars’ claim that
an actor’s level of power is not the only determining factor to change a norm and under suitable
structural conditions, even powerless actors can trigger change in the harmful norm (Deitelhoff
& Zimmermann, 2019). These norm changes ultimately reshape not only national politics but,
also, influence international politics. However, the conditions and the mechanism under which
powerless actors’ contestations results in change or challenge of harmful norm have been
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insufficiently studied. As discussed previously, this study offers a model through which potential
mechanisms can be analyzed to address the question of when these conditions exist. That answer
will contribute to norm contestation theories.
This chapter examines a series of experiments that build from a baseline model with
assumptions intended to model the emergence of a contesting norm, in both democratic and nondemocratic cultures. To analyze the results of each experiment I use path a dependence approach,
which I explain prior to discussing the model setup. After that, I first provide one potential
explanation for the main research question: under which conditions contesting of a restrictive
legal norm results in emergence of a new norm in democratic and non-democratic cultures. To
do so I explain cultural factors which are different in democratic and non democratic societies in
detail and modify the model based on those factors. Next, I examine the consequences of the
study assumptions regarding anger as a response to attempted suppression of deviations from the
norm. Then, I investigate the impact of showing extreme behavior during collective actions and
the consequances. After that, I test the importance of norm-antipreneurer23 to promote the old
norm and keep the status quo in this dynamic process of transferring from an old norm to a new
norm. In the last set of tests, I examine whether contestation of an old norm might end up with
different or similar results when there exists less pressure and punishment. At the end I
summarize this chapter with concluding remarks.
Path Dependence as an Approach to Analyzing the Results and Discussion
Path dependence has important implications for social and political science (Goldstone,
1998; Isaac, Street, & Knapp, 1994; Kimeldorf, 1988; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Lipset, Trow, &
Coleman, 1956; Mahoney, 2000). What needs to be elaborated here is “reactive path

23

Those who promote the old norm.
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dependence,” which is the case of this theoretical model. This type of path dependence is
composed of several connected events in which each event or step depends on its antecedent
event and itself is a cause for a next event. In reactive path dependence the final event is the
particular outcome that researchers wish to investigate. Thus, the overall sequences can be
considered as a chain to reach this outcome. Early events are very important and they trigger the
development and motion in the whole system. They are so important that Pierson (2000) believes
“initial disturbances are crucial not because they generate positive feedback, but because they
trigger a powerful response ... action and reaction move the system in a new direction.” One
famous historical example of that initial event or initial disturbance is Rosa Parks’ violation of
segregation laws when she refused to vacate her seat on the public bus. It is important to mention
that those initial events, which are also called critical junctures, move the system, are contingent,
and often happen at an intersection of two or more independent sequences of events. They are
considered contingent because it is neither predictable at which point of time those two
independent sequences need to intersect, nor is it possible to anticipate what specific initial event
will be shaped due to their intersection (Aminzade, 1992; Zuckerman, 1997). Back to the
example, Rosa Parks would violate the law when there was not enough support for her action in
the society to push the violation forward. Or, in another case, as a matter of having agency, Rosa
Parks might choose to not violate and vacate the seat, while there was enough support for the
violation of segregation laws. Thus, that initial event or critical juncture is contingent. To clarify,
I borrow Figure 52 and Figure 53 from Mahoney’s (2000) work.
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Figure 52. Two Independent Sequences with No Enduring Critical Juncture

Mahoney (2000) depicts this causal process in Figure 52. to clarify the difference
between two independent events. On the left side are two independent events which do not have
any intersection. On the right side, the two independent events intersect and that generates a
critical juncture which has no enduring consequences. Thus, each sequence continues its
previous logic and pattern. Figure 52. shows two independent events that intersect and then
generate the critical juncture which has an enduring consequence.
As shown in Figure 52. when there is no intersection between two independent
sequences, each would continue its casual process independently. Or they may intersect, but the
overall sequence is only disturbed temporarily and then returns to its logic. Thus, the critical
juncture point has no lasting consequences. The intersection must generate a critical juncture
event with enduring consequence, as shown in Figure 53. to be considered and studied for path
dependence.
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Figure 53. Two Independent Sequences with an Enduring Critical Juncture

Both examples in Figure 53. show the path dependence process but the important feature
here is the difference between the temporal points: when the intersection happens, the results
change significantly. As Mahoney (2000) states, “it matters a great deal if two sequences collide
at an earlier or later point in their trajectories.” I will go back to this very important feature of
path dependence later in the chapter and discuss how the intersection at different temporal points
changes the results.
Even when the intersection generates a critical juncture which moves the system in a new
direction, it is still hard to predict the final events directly and definitively. Rather, several
connecting and intervening events need to be investigated between the initial event and final
event to be able to explain the ultimate outcome. The intervening events are the main focus in
path dependence. Analyzing each step not only provides the researchers the narrative of the
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process but it also gives them the opportunity to study counterfactual situations. What if that
intervening event does not happen?
Going back to our study, there are two independent sequences of events. Their
intersection generates the first violation as an initial event.
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Figure 54. Possible Path Dependence Map for New Norm Emergence

Figure 54. illustrates this situation where the events are defined as follows:
A. Government Restrictive Law
B. Systematic Disparities

122

C. People Have Shared Grievance
D. Civil Societies’ Emergence
E. Education Through Civil Societies
F. Forming Shared Intersubjective Understanding that the old norm is not a good norm or
there exists a better norm to be a substitute
G. First Violation
H. Violators Group Formation
I.

Internalization of the New Norm

J. Group Violating Behavior
K. Emergence of a New Norm
Thus, to change a norm in a society there is a need for several factors to work together to
get rid of the old norm. I already talked about human subjectivity and its importance in this
study. In fact, this study is based upon the claim that individuals in the community have agency
and can evaluate and reason about the norm. Thus, while there exists a group of people in the
society that are the old norm’s true believers, there are also some individuals who reject that
norm totally.
The path that begins with A represents a government discriminatory law which results in
the shared feeling of grievance among a group in a society. The path that begins with D
illustrates when a civil society plays a major role in the process of educating people and/or
changing their perception about what is right or wrong (Arendt, 1960; Richardson, 2020). In
other words, civil society tries to weaken the harmful norm and bring people to a shared
intersubjective understanding that the old norm is not good. Finally, it is necessary for these two
events to intersect at the appropriate temporal point to shape the initial violation or critical
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juncture. For this study, that event is the norm contestation event, which is shown as event G,
and without that the two independent events might continue on their own paths. This contestation
is contingent and depends on human subjectivity and agency. Thus, it might change, weaken, or
make no change in the old norm. If the contestation happens at the appropriate time, when an
adequate amount of people in the society come to the shared intersubjective understanding about
the old norm and shared feeling of grievance, we could be optimistic that initial contestation will
move the system in the way that changes the old norm. However, as mentioned earlier, that is not
a definite outcome. There are other intervening events that play a significant role. But for sure
we can say that if that contestation does not happen at the appropriate time, the result will be
different. In other words, the initial contestation can only challenge the old norm, not cause it to
change it.
In this study, I model a society in which those two independent sequences that intersect at
some temporal point and create the initial violation. To show how that violation changes the
direction of the system, I assume the initial norm violation triggers a reaction in the society
which I represent in my model with the variable Pro-Category Emotion. That results in a
perception of similarity causing the formation of a violating group in the society. Scholars
believe that individuals’ feelings and emotions both create and maintain that shared
intersubjective understanding among a group of deprived people (Ron Aminzade & McAdam,
2001; Snow & Benford, 1992; Snow, Rochford Jr, Worden, & Benford, 1986). In other words,
shared feelings of grievance among people leads to a shared understanding. I show this shared
intersubjective understanding in the society by the change in the Pro-Category Emotion value
due to the first violation. For this study I assume the first violation increases the Pro-Category
Emotion by 0.5 among people in the society (variable range is zero to one). This means that the
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old norm has an average strength in the society. As is discussed earlier, predicting the temporal
point is not possible. Usually, civil societies use that initial contestation as an intervention to
trigger people in the society and activate their shared emotion based on shared grievance. This
may only weaken the norm, but sometimes it will actually change the norm.
For this study, I am not going to elaborate on the two independent sequences as there is a
great deal of literature on civil societies and their role in education and on how discriminatory
law causes systematic disparities and shared feelings of grievance. But my model begins with the
first violation, which is the initial event or critical juncture. The rest of the chapter discusses the
process I used with the model and the results.
Simulation Model Set Up for Democratic-Loose and Non-Democratic-Tight Culture
In the literature review section, I explained the difference between these two cultures in
detail. Based on that discussion, I made some assumptions about the impact these cultures have
on certain variables. I discuss these variables below, and then Table 11. summarizes the initial
value (democratic and loose culture) and the adjustment made for non-democratic and tight
cultures.
Learning Coefficient In democratic and loose cultures, there are more resources available
to educate people, and both people and social media are accessible and relatively free. Indeed,
there exists less government sanctioning on educational content in those societies. As a result,
the rate of learning about potential new norms is higher in a democratic culture compared to a
non-democratic and tight culture (Arnett, 1995; Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006; Sussman &
Karlekar, 2002). In particular, the coefficient for learning is 70 percent in the democratic culture
model runs, and 30 percent in the non-democratic ones.
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Peer Punishment Peer pressure is represented by the variable Peer Punishment. It is one
of the main punishments in enforcing a norm. Avoiding a norm results in feeling pressure from
peers. The fear of being abandoned or the feeling of disgust from your social group is an obstacle
for norm violators and for the transition to a new norm in general. However, the effect of that
pressure is not the same in a democratic culture, which is more individualistic compared with
non-democratic societies, where the culture is more collectivist. Peer punishment has more of an
effect in tight societies. Obviously, the distinction is a bit less critical between democratic and
non-democratic cultures than it is between individualistic and collectivist or communitarian
cultures, but the two tend to go together to some degree (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010;
Hofstede, 2001; Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, & Scott, 2004). In the model, Peer-Punishment is set
at 0.6 for the democratic and loose culture runs and 0.9 for the non-democratic and tight culture
runs.
Government Punishment As discussed earlier, punishment is the main mechanism used to
enforce a norm and any violation of norm resulted in government punishment to some degree. If
you smoke in a closed place or throw trash in the street in Singapore, the police might warn you
the first time and then fine you for subsequent violations. The same behavior in a country where
the government exercises less control may result in just a warning. In this model, there exists a
similar situation. Norm contesters will get punished, but the government in non-democratic and
tight cultures is expected to impose more severe and/or frequent punishment (Arnett, 1995;
Gelfand et al., 2006). Therefore, I consider that government punishment to have a more
restrictive effect on violations in non-democratic and tight cultures. Specifically, in the model
runs, Government Punishment is set at 0.6. This represents the situation in democratic and loose
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cultures. When the model is run to represent non-democratic and tight cultures the value is set to
0.9.

Table 11. Democratic vs Non-democratic Cultural Parameters

Parameter

Initial Value

NonDemocratic
Culture

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

5%

Learning Coefficient

70%

30%

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

0.1

0.1

Effect of First Violation on Pro-Category

0.5

0.5

Peer Punishment

0.6

0.9

Government Punishment

0.5

0.9

Emotion

Exercising the Simulation Model
In this section, I describe how a system dynamic model allows us to simulate and
evaluate the effect of different variables and conditions for new norm emergence. I begin this
section with a discussion of base run behavior for democratic culture and then non-democratic
culture.
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Base Run Behavior for Democratic and Loose Culture
To address the main questions of this study, I begin with a simulation run which includes
initial conditions to determine the conditions that result in emergence of a new norm under
democratic and then non-democratic cultures.
As described in the previous chapters, the simulation is modeled using Vensim. The initial
conditions which are shown in Table 12. facilitate new norm emergence and are already
described in detail in the previous chapter. It should be noted that I only provide key variables
that affect system behavior. Manual exploration, combined with the sensitivity analysis
discussed in the previous chapter, were used to identify the key parameters.

Table 12. Democratic Parameters’ Initial Value

Parameter

Initial Value

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

Learning Coefficient

70%

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

0.1

Effect of Anger on Positive Feeling

0.7

Effect of First Violation on Pro-Category Emotion

0.5
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In this simulation run, as shown in Table 12., 70 percent of the population is assumed to be
educated in the sense that they learn and accept the new norm. Based on the literature, in democratic
cultures freedom of speech and social media enable a higher level of education and information
transmission in comparision to non-democratic cultures. However, I consider approximately 70 percent of
the population learn and accept the new norm due to factors such as violators’ uncertainty about the new
norm’s benefit or a competing norm in the society which attracts violators and prohibit them from
moving toward the new norm.
The Percentage of Dissimilarity is a constant. This variable shows the percentage of the violators
group population that percieves dissimilarity between their interests and goals and the contesting group
goal. There are three primary reasons for this: (1) they do not refute the old norm totally, (2) the
government or old-norm defenders are able to encourage them to follow the old norm again, or (3) they
might find another competing norm to be more appropriate. For one or more of these reasons, they leave
the violators group. This percentage of dissimilarity due to different goals is one of the main reasons why
individuals detach from the group (Posten & Mussweiler, 2013; Richardson, 2020). Therefore, it is
important for the initial value of this variable to be insignificant. I assume its initial value is five percent.
Clearly, changes in these parameters can change the results and I will discuss this in detail in the norm
antipreneur scenario.
Also, government punishment results in anger among people who percieve that punishment as
illigitimate in both democratic and non-democratic societies—like what happened when the Canadian
governmnet punished Dr. Henry Morgentaler during the Canadian abortion law movement (Stevenson,
2019).
Likelihood of Extreme Behavior is another key parameter in this model. Extreme behaviour,
which is also known as faux activist in the literature, is considered to involve a wide range of
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actions including lighting fires on public transportation or vandalizing public places. Often, the
result is to reduce the group behaviour, because it not only causes anti-group emotion, which
reduces the group behavior, but it also triggers government action in the form of prompt and
severe punishment. Clearly, it has a negative effect on the process and needs to be relatively
insignificant for the base run (other values will be explored later). I assume the likelihood of
having extreme behavior among those opposed to the old norm in the society is 10 percent. Of
course, similar to the Perception of Dissimilarity, a change in this parameter changes the results.
I discuss this further in the Effect of Asymmetric Extreme Behavior scenario.
Finally, I assume that initial norm contestation, represented by the variable Effect of First
Violation on Pro-Category Emtion, has a value of 0.5. This means that the old norm has an average
strength; it is neither weak nor strong. In other words, a considerable portion of a society comes to a
shared intersubjective undrestanding about that old norm as not being beneficial. Violation of the norm
not only causes negative feelings among some portion of society; it also causes positive feelings among
another portion of the population.
The base run results are shown is in Figure 55. which depicts the key populations and
their expected behavior. The base run experiment has been exercised in democratic culture and
the results support my conceptual model.
Based on the results shown in Figure 55. a tipping point occurs at approximately year 68.
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) describe tipping points in their theory of norm life cycle from a
political science point of view. I discussed a norm’s life cycle in detail in the literature review
chapter. It is a dynamic process that includes three stages: 1) norm emergence; 2) norm cascades;
and 3) internalization. A tipping point happens somewhere between stages one and two. It is the
time when adaptation of a new norm becomes considerably faster than before and after that point
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the new norm cascades among the population. At this time an old norm has lost the majority of its
followers and its robustness explicitly shrinks. The transfer of power between followers of two groups
begins and there is a shift between new norm opponents and proponents (Gilardi 2010).
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Figure 55. New Norm Emergence Results Under Democratic Culture

The tipping point is the time in which contesters can think of getting rid of government pressure
and begin to lobby with government elites and officials who have strong influence in the society and in
the governmental system (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The aim for those lobbying is to gain the
support of elites for the peaceful negotiation of a change to the law with respect for public opinion. Iglič
and Rus (2000) state that new elites—those who are less powerful—are better targets for
contesters for negotiation. To advance their status in the society, the new elites need a potential
tool to increase their power to be able to balance against the old elites. Negotiation with new
norm followers provides them that potential tool and power.
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In this simulation run, which happens on democratic culture, the model behaves as it was
expected. This means that the conceptual model and simulation model in this study come to the
same results and support each other. Thus, the theory provides one potential explanation for the
research question. We already discussed that the behavior of the model is supported by previous
scholar’s studies (Randers, 1973) which support the validity of the model. At this point, the
results of this study can provide the answer to the research question and contributes to the field
of norm study.
The results can be summarized in the following statements: In democratic societies
whenever a sufficient population of a given society comes to a shared understanding that an old
restrictive norm is not beneficial for them and there exist other norms which can fulfill their goal
and interest more, initial contestation can be formed as a critical point and move the system in
the new direction. And that means some portion of the people in a given society feel positive
about that contestation rather than negative. That positive feeling causes perceptions of similarity
among them. Thus, they begin to join the violators. After the violators group forms, a
considerable percentage of violators need to be educated to learn and accept the new norm, and
eventually internalize that norm. This parameter is not the only factor needed in order to have a
significant number of violators internalize the new norm. At the same time, it is necessary to
have an insignificant percentage of the violators’ population perceive different goals and
dissimilarity regarding the new norm. These two parameters need to be fulfilled as it is shown in
Table 12. for the population to move toward the new norm. When a group of violators, who have
internalized a new norm, begin to explicitly behave based on the new norm, they are at risk of
being punished by government and their peers. But that punishment does not always suppress the
violating behavior; sometimes the punishment causes angriness among new norm followers and
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consequently public outcry. Thus, if government punishment results in angriness, which is
shown in Table 12., violators take riskier actions and show more violating behavior. This results
in the emergence of a new norm as a normative behavior. Of course, in this dynamic process
violators not only need to not show excessive extreme behavior (as will be examined later) but
they also need to be cautious and manage any third-party or possible governmental extreme
behavior activities.
I would like to end this section with a discussion that further examines how the temporal
point where the two independent sequences intersect is crucial. I discussed the importance of this
point earlier in the path dependence section and here I try to clarify it with some examples.
Figure 56. illustrates how the intersection of two independent sequences at different temporal
points changes the results. The top left of Figure 56. shows the results when a sufficient portion
of the population is educated and comes to the shared understanding that the old norm is not
beneficial for the society prior to the triggering event of the first violation. The top right of
Figure 56. depicts another temporal point where there is not a considerable portion of the
population with this shared understanding. The bottom of Figure 56. depicts the situation when
norm contestation results in no change in the society because the old norm is still robust and
almost everyone follows that norm. The first violation does not trigger the formation of a group
of violators in this last scenario.
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Figure 56. Different Results Due to Initial Violation Event at Different Temporal Point

Base Run Behavior for Non-Democratic and Tight Culture
To simulate the base run behavior for nondemocratic culture, I adjust the simulation
model based on the cultural parameters shown in Table 11. and keep other parameters equal. The
new parameters sample is shown in Table 13.
As shown in Figure 56., the initial conditions do not change the norm as much in nondemocratic cultures. Those conditions only weaken the dominant norm and increase the
population of violators. Although the old norm was weakened, the contestation is not successful
enough to change the norm. This scenario supports what the path dependence literature explains
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about the importance of an appropriate time for “critical juncture,” which in this case is the
“initial violation” event.

Table 13. Non-Democratic and Tight Parameters’ Initial Value

Parameter

Initial Value

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

Learning Coefficient

30%

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

0.1

Effect of Anger on Positive Feeling

0.7

Effect of First Violation on Pro-Category Emotion

0.5

Peer Punishment

0.9

Government Punishment

0.9

Of course, after that violation the old norm is not as strong as it was before, but the
violation did not change the path enough to convince people to accept the new norm. This
situation gives the competing groups, or even the government, an opportunity to absorb the
violators and/or to encourage violators to go back to the old norm by using slightly different
language and interpretation through an antipreneur.24 As is discussed in a later section of this

24

Later, I will discuss antipreneurs and their role in this dynamic process.
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chapter, this is similar to what happened in the Iranian women’s contestation (Tohidi, 2003). But
why does this happen?
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Figure 57. New Norm Population Under Non-Democratic Culture

As shown in Figure 58. due to the government control on social media or limited activist
activity in the non-democratic culture, there exists limited educational resources. This results in
fewer people learning and adopting a new norm and in consequence moving toward that new
norm as a behavioral standard. Rather, the society faces a huge number of violators who do not
have a strong shared identity and that weakens their ability to take collective action.
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Figure 58. Number of People Who Socialize Toward a New Norm and Violators Population

We can see from Figure 59. that educating people toward a new norm is not as possible in
a non-democratic culture as it is in a democratic culture, which might be due to resource
availability or popular resistance. As a result, the increasing number of violators, without a
clearly communicated new norm, provides the opportunity for other competing groups or the
government to influence them. As a result, as shown in Figure 59., people are convinced to
practice the old norm and the number of people who internalize, and act based on the new norm
decreases.
Educating violators is only one part of this dynamic process. More government control
and peer pressure both decreased risk taking because the cost for violating actions increases
while the benefit decreases. Risk taking is reduced and group violating actions diminish; Figure
59. shows these results.
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Figure 59. Risk Taking and Group Violating Behaviour Under Non-Democratic Culture

The base run behavior does not lead to the emergence of a new norm—it only weakens
the old norm. It is possible, however, that if initial norm violation happens at a more appropriate
time, and when the norm is weaker, it could lead to new norm emergence even in the nondemocratic culture runs. The conditions would have to be substantially more propitious for this
to take place. The next section explores such conditions.
Effect of Norm Robustness; Weak vs. Average Strength Norm in Non-Democratic Culture
Scholars have widely differing ideas about how to conceptualize norm robustness. While
some focus primarily on the discursive dimension, others rely only on the practical dimension of
norm to evaluate its robustness. Scholars who only focus on the discursive strength of a norm
define it as a verbal acceptance of a norm in the society. They believe that when a norm is
strong, there exists a general belief and diverse support for that norm, which have their roots in a
shared value of the norm among people in the society (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019;
Simmons & Jo, 2019). On the other hand, scholars who believe the practical dimension is a
better tool to determine norm robustness define it as the degree in which the norm guides the
followers’ actions and behavior in the society. A third approach combines these ideas (Deitelhoff
& Zimmermann, 2019). Thus, there is no universal standard to conceptualize norm robustness.
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However, accepting the limitations in this task and assessing the analytical tools each approach
offers I decided to use the third approach for this study. I followed the conceptualization of this
approach and adjusted the parameter values based on this. The remainder of this section
discusses the details of the process. I first adjust the parameters based on the discursive-based
definition and run the model. Next, I do the same for practical dimension of the norm. Finally, I
combine both dimensions to analyze the results.
Discursive Dimension of Norm Robustness
The discursive dimension of a norm is evaluated by two factors:
•

Concordance: A norm is robust when it has a high level of concordance. Legro (1997)
measures concordance as how widely that norm is intersubjectively agreed upon among
the followers and their discussion, which can be contributed to all state, non-state, and
citizen actors. This means that the majority of a society needs to have a shared
understanding and belief about that norm. Thus, to implement concordance in my model,
I change the initial value for the Pro-Category Emotion variable due to the first violation.
That means the population of a society has a shared value and intersubjective
understanding of the norm which causes similar shared feelings. A weak norm has a low
concordance in favor of it and high concordance against it and vice versa for a strong
norm. To show a contesting norm has a strong concordance, I need to increase that initial
value.

•

Third-Party reaction to norm violators: A robust old norm has strong third-party
sanctioning on norm violators (Deitelhoff & Zimmermann, 2019). To show stronger
third-party sanctioning, I consider more effect for peer pressure. Thus, I change the
initial value for Peer Punishment from 0.9 to 0.7 to show that the norm has a weaker
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third-party sanctioning. Table 14. shows the change in the parameters value for a
discursively average and weak norm in non-democratic society.

Table 14. Non-Democratic Parameters’ Initial Value for Discursive-Based Weak vs. Average Norm

Parameter

Initial Value

Discursive-

Non-Democratic

Based Weak
Norm

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

5%

Learning Coefficient

30%

30%

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

0.1

0.1

Effect of Anger on Positive Feeling

0.7

0.7

Effect of First Violation on Pro-Category

0.5

0.6

0.9

0.7

Emotion
Peer Punishment

Clearly, a discursively weak norm can be challenged more easily and weakend even more
but that does not mean the the norm will be completely replaced by a new norm, as shown in
Figure 60. We can see that the tipping point happens sometimes around year 90.
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Figure 60. New Norm Population Under Discursive-Based Weak Norm

One of the reasons this change happens is clearly due to less peer pressure, which I show
in the Feeling of Disgust graph in Figure 61. We can see that peer pressure drops to almost 0.1
when a norm is weak, while it does not go below 0.4 in an average norm. As a result, there
would be less negative feeling and more risk taking in the society (see Risk Taking graph in
Figure 61)

Figure 61. Feeling of Disgust and Risk Taking in Non-Democratic Culture
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From Figure 61 we can also see that a significant number of violators exist in the society
which, due to lack of education, do not move forward to learn and internalize the new norm. As a
result, the number of people who learn and internalize the new norm does not change
significantly (Figure 62.). Civil societies and their civic education are crucial parameters that can
change the process and results drastically.

Figure 62. Learning and Internalizing a New Norm in Non-Democratic Culture

Practice-Based Dimension of Norm Robustness
The practical dimension of a norm is evaluated by the two factors explained below:
•

Compliance: In international politics, scholars define a norm as robust when a few states
violate the norm and most others follow it (Glennon, 2004). As we are dealing with
individuals here, I consider a norm to be robust when most of the people behave in a way
that is consistent with the old norm. Thus, to show the norm is weaker than average, I
change the percent of people who violate the old norm and those who follow that. As a
result, I change initial value for p1 (old norm population) from 0.97 to 0.95 and p2
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(violators norm population) from 0.01 to 0.03, which means more people behave against
the norm.
•

Implementation: when a norm is strong, the government expends more regulatory and
monitoring efforts on the implementing norm. In other words, a government might offer
several versions of a law to make sure it is implemented sufficiently. Or, the government
may have more monitoring resources to make sure that a law is put into effect properly. I
show this by changing the maximum effect of Government Punishment and Percentage
of Dissimilarity. I change the former from 0.9 to 0.7 and the latter from five percent to
four percent, which shows the government has less power to implement the norm. The
changes are summarized in Table 15.

Table 15. Non-Democratic Parameters’ Initial Value for Practice-Based Weak vs. Average Norm

Parameter

Initial Value

Practice-Based

Non-Democratic

Weak Norm

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

4%

Effect of First Violation on Pro-Category

0.5

0.5

Government Punishment

0.9

0.7

Old Norm Population, P1

0.97

0.95

Violators Group population, P2

0.01

0.03

Emotion
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As shown in Figure 63., a practice-based weak norm is easier to challenge in comparison to
an average strength norm. However, in this current scenario the tipping point between the two
populations does not happen. The question here is why the discursive-based weak norm reaches
the tipping point but the practice-based weak norm does not.
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Figure 63. New Norm Population Under Practice-Based Weak Norm

Why that happens could be answered by the difference in positive feeling in each
situation. As shown in Figure 64., positive feelings in a discursive-based weak norm exceed
the two others due to a stronger shared understanding and feeling in the society. Indeed, less
peer pressure in the society in the discursive-based weak norm further increases risk taking
as shown in Figure 64.
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Figure 64. Positive Feeling and Risk Taking in Non-Democratic Culture

The other parameter that causes this difference is Government Punishment. It is stronger
in a weak discursive-based norm, but it does not result in a smaller violating group. This can be
explained by the existence of higher risk taking in a discursive-based weak norm, either due to
less peer pressure, or as a result of a lower probability of getting angry because the government
punishes the violators less, as shown in Figure 64.
Mixed-Dimension of Norm Robustness
In this scenario, I combine both the discursive and the practice dimension of norm
robustness and see how that changes the situation. All parameter values are adjusted based on
previous discussion and are summarized in Table 16.

Figure 65. Feeling of Anger and Government Punishment in Non-Democratic Culture
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Table 16. Non-Democratic Parameters’ Initial Value for Weak vs. Average Norm

Parameter

Initial Value

Combined Weak

Non-Democratic

Norm

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

4%

Effect of First Violation on Pro-Category

0.5

0.6

Peer Punishment

0.9

0.7

Government Punishment

0.9

0.7

Old Norm Population, P1

0.97

0.95

Violators Group population, P2

0.01

0.03

Emotion

As shown in Figure 66., there is a possibility that the old norm will be replaced by a new
norm in non-democratic societies. The tipping point occurs around year 73 and at least half of
the population believes in the new norm at year 100.
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Figure 66. New Norm Emergence in Non-Democratic Culture

The conditions I define in Table 16. result in the emergence of a new norm under nondemocratic culture. Based on these conditions, in order to have a successful contestation, the
initial violation (event G in Figure 54.) needs to happen at the time when the incumbent norm is
discursively weaker and governmental control on the norm is not very strong. However, as was
discussed earlier, this alone is not enough (event K); the connecting steps must be fulfilled.
As shown in Figure 67., with a weak norm the initial contestation, is more fruitful as an
intervention and increases the perception of similarity. In other words, when a norm is weaker,
not only is the perception of similarity greater among society, but more people are ready and
looking for an opportunity to join a group and violate that norm. Thus, the transfer rate is
increased. Indeed, due to less government monitoring and advertisement there will be fewer
people who go back to the old norm. Instead, they socialize toward a new norm.
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Figure 67. Transfer Rate and Dissimilarity Rate Under Weak Norm

Clearly, when the government exercises less control and monitoring, the feeling of fear
decreases and less pressure by the society means less feeling of disgust about the violation of the
norm. As is shown in Figure 68., this causes more risk taking and, consequently, group violating
behavior, which results in a new norm emergence.

Figure 68. Risk Taking and Group Violating Behavior Under Weak Norm
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Investigating Intervening Events Through Different Scenarios
Although it is important to know the overall sequence of events that leads to the final
outcome (shown by A-K for this study), there exist several smaller and intervening connections
between these events that are not shown with a direct link but are main objects of analysis in path
dependence (Mahoney, 2000). I already discussed that First Violation leads to the violators’ group
formation, event H, but that does not assure us of the emergence of a new norm. Adequate
educational resources which provide collective beliefs about the new norm among violators play
an important role at this stage, while lack of that might result in less competing norm strength and
change the situation. In addition, perception of dissimilarity that results in distrust toward a new
norm is another connecting factor: if a considerable group of people perceive dissimilarity the final
outcome will change. Moreover, even if an adequate number of violators internalize the new norm
and begin practicing that norm, contesters need to take risks to show that violating behavior
publicly. Of course, individuals are rational and do cost/benefit analysis: it is costly to be
abandoned by your peers and punished by government. Thus, the effect of government and peer
punishment needs not to surpass the positive feeling among violators. This cost-benefit calculation
is contingent on several factors such as if government punishment is perceived as illegitimate and
triggers feelings of anger, or if the government suppresses that anger by specific policies, or if
there is less peer pressure on the violators. Any of these connecting factors can change the situation
and change the final outcome.
Effect of Anger on Emergence of a New Norm
One of the main arguments of this study, which is depicted in Figure 69. is:
Government punishment might result in feelings of angriness and increase risk taking rather
than decrease risk taking as intended, and this encourages more people to violate the norm. In
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consequence it increases both the number of people who behave based on the new norm and
those who perceive similarity with violators.
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Figure 69. Effect of Feeling of Anger on New Norm Emergence

In this experiment to test this novel argument I keep all other variables the same and only
change the initial value for effect of anger on positive feeling to see how it affects growth in the
new norm population. Table 17. summarizes the values used for the model runs of this
experiment.

Table 17. Base Run Democratic vs. Increase in Angriness Parameters

Parameter

Initial Value High Anger

Low

No Anger

Anger
Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

5%

5%

5%
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Table17. Continued

Parameter

Initial Value High Anger

Low

No Anger

Anger
Learning Coefficient

70%

70%

70%

70%

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

0.1

0.1

0.1

0.1

Effect of Anger on Positive

0.7

1

0.4

0

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

Feeling towards Violators
Effect of First Violation on ProCategory Emotion

As shown in Figure 70., choosing government punishment as an encouraging source of
action in some cases seems to be a valid assumption considering the results from the simulation.
This is arguably like what happened in the Stonewall Inn riots concerning LGBTQ rights.

Figure 70. Feeling of Anger and Positive Feeling with Asymmetric Feeling of Anger

The graph on the left side depicts the expected behavior of increasing and decreasing the
Effect of Anger variable. The reason increasing feelings of anger result in more rapid growth of
the contesting norm population can be explained by looking at the graphs in Figure 70. The
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initial value for Effect of Anger affects positive feeling toward violators. An increase in feelings
of anger increase the benefit to take risks and, in consequence, violating behavior. Additionally,
it increases the rate a new norm emerges through its practice by people. If those feelings of anger
are suppressed, we see the opposite results.
As it is clear from above results, governments potentially need to be cautious when it
comes to punishing violators. If punishing violators would be perceived as unjustified or the
punishment as illegitimate, which triggers anger, then the punishment could backfire. Feelings of
anger that cause more violating behavior have another side effect. It causes more people from
outside the group to notice the ongoing violation, and due to emotional ties, perceive similarity
(Figure 71.). They may then join the violators which further weakens the old norm. Thus,
governments usually seek a policy to justify their punishment and reduce feelings of anger.

Figure 71. Effect of Asymmetric Feeling of Anger on Violating Behavior

Effect of Asymmetric Extreme Behavior/Faux Activist on New Norm Emergence
An enduring question for activists is how far to go in pushing for change and engaging in
extreme behavior. For instance, in the context of the effort to change public views and to get
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government attention and funding to fight the AIDS epidemic, should activists fight with police
and disrupt public order, or should they create a quilt (Abumrad & Miller, 2020, December, 18)?
I noted earlier in this chapter that there are several connecting and intervening variables
that affect the sequences of the event toward the outcome. One of those variables is Likelihood of
Extreme Behavior. This variable is called Faux Activists in the literature (Marx, 2012). It impacts
group violating behavior and government punishment. For this experiment I am interested to see
how facing asymmetric extreme behavior might change the final outcome. Thus, I change the
extreme behavior initial value from 0.1 to 0.15 then to 0.01, as shown in Table 18.

Table 18. Base Run Democratic vs. Extreme Behavior

Parameter

Initial Value

High Extreme

Low Extreme

Behavior

Behavior

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

5%

5%

Learning Coefficient

70%

70%

70%

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

0.1

0.15

0.01

Effect of Anger on Positive Feeling

0.7

0.7

0.7

Effect of First Violation on Pro-

0.5

0.5

0.5

Category Emotion

As shown in Figure 72., showing more extreme behavior during the collective action can
change the outcome significantly. In this case, the new norm has not even reached the tipping
point in our time frame, although contestation weakens the old norm and there does exist a
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considerable population of violators. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 72., having too little
extreme behavior during the collective violation results in the emergence of a new norm sooner
in comparison with the results of initial value.
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Figure 72. New Norm Population Due to Assymetric Extreme Behavior

But how does this variable cause that change? Extreme behavior causes a prompt and
intense response by the government to suppress the violators. This punishment results in less
group violating behavior because it increases the feeling of fear due to more severe suppression.
This means the cost for risk taking is higher and the benefit is lower. Figure 73. shows how the
cost and benefit changes due to asymmetric extreme behavior.
However, it should be noted that risk taking, and feelings of fear and anger are not the only
reasons that the new norm population decreases. Due to extreme behavior, group behavior
decreases as a result of increased punishment, as shown in Figure 74. In addition, another
unanticipated result is that the more extreme behavior there is, the more anti-group emotion there
is, which means other people in the society feel less similarity with violators and the transfer rate
from the old norm decreases.
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Figure 73. Effect of Asymmetric Extreme Behavior on Positive & Negative Feelings

Usually, severe and/or unjustified government punishment triggers feelings of anger.
However, extreme behavior not only gives the government the opportunity for more intense
control, it also gives the government a more legitimate excuse to crack down on the extreme
behavior. This decreases the feeling of anger among people in response to that punishment
(Marx, 2012).

Figure 74. Effect of Asymmetric Extreme Behavior on Transfer Rate
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These results support the idea that the path from event A to K in our model is contingent
upon not only their antecedent events but also on intervening variables in order to have favorable
outcomes, and it is essential to study those variables. This is one of the reasons that in some
cases governments send agent provocateurs to take extreme measures to disrupt the progress of
collective action. It should be noted that those activists who show extreme behavior might come
from a group supporting a competing norm, which finds the situation favorable. If the old norm
is weak and there is a considerable number of violators in the society, a competing norm group
may hope to absorb them (Marx, 1974). Historical examples of this case could be the FBI's
Counterintelligence Program’s impact on feminist organizations’ activity or the Black Party
movement in the 1960s (Cunningham, 2004; Donner, 1990).
Effect of Norm Antipreneurs
Although there is a great deal of literature on the importance of norm
entrepreneures/promoters in the field, there has been less attention to norm antipreneures and
their role. Only recently, Bloomfield (2016) introduced the theory of norm antipreneurer and the
importance of this group of actors. He defines them as a group of people who try to maintain the
status quo or, in other words, promote the old norm. In this scenario, I am interested in finding
out whether my model supports the literature. Thus, I assume that under more active
antipreneurship, we will face more perception of dissimilarity with the violators and new norm
groups due to the antipreneur’s attempt to educate people toward valuing an old norm.
To examine the assumption, I only change the percentage of dissimilarity (here once
again starting from the democratic base line parameters) from five percent to 15 percent and then
to 30 percent to show the effect of this connecting variable in this process. All parameters for this
scenarion are summarized in Table 19.
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Table 19. Base Run vs. Higher Norm Antipreneurs’ Activity

Parameter

Initial Value

Norm
Antipreneurs
Value

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

15%

Learning Coefficient

70%

70%

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

0.1

0.1

Effect of Anger on Positive Feeling

0.7

0.7

Effect of First Violation on Pro-Category

0.5

0.5

Emotion

Based on the results, which are shown in Figure 75., norm antipreneurs appear to be another
connecting variable that plays a significant role in this dynamic process. This result is consistent
with the literature. Although scholars in the field mostly focus on the norm promoters, the results
for this study show that under some educational resources/socialization conditions, education
toward the old norm matters by reducing the rate at which the old norm is replaced.

157

Norm Population
400 M

Person

300 M

200 M

100 M

0
0

10

20

30

40

50
60
Time (Year)

70

80

90

100

Dominant Norm Population : Norm Antipreneurs Base Run.vdfx
New Norm Population : Norm Antipreneurs Base Run.vdfx
Violators Group Population : Norm Antipreneurs Base Run.vdfx
Internalized the Contesting Norm Population : Norm Antipreneurs Base Run.vdfx

Figure 75. New Norm Emergence Under Strong Norm Antipreneurs

A norm antipreneur can use language that is more like the violators’ goal and interests by
reinterpreting the old norm to convince them that the old norm is what they need. An example of
this situation is emergence of “Right Wing Conservative Feminism” during the Iranian women’s
contestation for equal rights (Tohidi, 2003). As a result, they maintained the status quo by
increasing the perception that the new norm is not compatible with the violators’ goal. A
significant delay in the decline of the old norm is shown in Figure 76.

158

Figure 76. Effect of Asymmetric Antipreneurs’ Activity on Dominant Norm Population

These results reflect that a government policy of using antipreneurs could delay and/or
prevent the emergence of a new norm. Although a tipping point occurred around year 95 in this
run, during the 100-year time scale, the new norm population did not even amount to half of the
population. That means government officials can use this policy and not only postpone the
emergence of the new norm but indeed enforce the old norm in the society by partial differences.
Effect of Asymmetric Punishment
As we discussed earlier, punishment is the main mechanism to enforce a norm. Thus,
governments punish the violators. But what if a norm is not a matter of security like a norm of
humanitarianism or governments do not have much control over the norm, like keeping a gun at
home. In this experiment, I explore how contestation of norms that encounter less pressure might
challenge an old norm. To do so, I change the effect of government punishment. Its baseline
initial value is 0.6 and I change it to 0.3. And peer punishment also decreased from 0.5 to 0.25.
These changes summarize it in Table 20.
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Table 20. Parameters’ Values for Less Pressure

Parameter

Initial Value

Less Presure
Value

Percentage of Dissimilarity

5%

5%

Learning Coefficient

70%

70%

Likelihood of Extreme Behaviors

0.1

0.1

Effect of First Violation on Pro-Category

0.5

0.5

Peer Punishment

0.6

0.3

Government Punishment

0.5

0.25

Emotion

Based on the results, which are shown in Figure 77., the tipping point in this scenario occurred
around year 57, almost 10 years sooner than the base run.

Norm Population
400 M

Person

300 M

200 M

100 M

0
0

10

20

30

40

50
60
Time (Year)

70

Dominant Norm Population : Less Pressure Run.vdfx
New Norm Population : Less Pressure Run.vdfx
Violators Group Population : Less Pressure Run.vdfx
Internalized the Contesting Norm Population : Less Pressure Run.vdfx

Figure 77. New Norm Emergence Under Less Pressure
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These results are consistent with the expectation of what would happen with less pressure from
government and people feeling that it less risky to show violating behavior.

Figure 78. New Norm Population Under Less Pressure

Conclusion
In this chapter, I provide the answers to this study’s main question and explain the
mechanism under which a new norm might emerge in both democratic and non-democratic
cultures. Based on the results of this study, it is possible that an initial violation could trigger the
rise of a contesting norm which could become a dominant norm in a democratic society when the
old norm has average strength. However, it will not happen in a non-democratic society until or
unless the old norm becomes weak enough. After that, I study several existing policies as
intervening factors in this process such as extreme behavior or norm antipreneur activities which
could prevent or delay the emergence of a new norm. So, my theory, and the model I developed
to test it, provide answers to the existing questions the research has posed and contributes to the
literature. As we have seen, an initial violation that comes at an appropriate time can trigger the
replacement of an old norm with a new one. But the timing needs to be appropriate, and several
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other conditions can either slow or accelerate the adoption of the new norm. I will conclude this
study with a discussion of its limitations and future research areas in the next chapter.
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CONCLUSIONS

Model’s Answer to the Research Question
This study begins with the question: Under which conditions do powerless individual
actors’ contestation of harmful dominant norms cause the emergence of new norms which result
in changes in states’ behavior.
To address that question, I used social identity theory to develop my theoretical model.
Model runs simulated both democratic loose and non-democratic tight societies. Based on the
model’s results, an average strength norm can be replaced in loose societies when a large enough
percentage of people comes to a shared understanding. This primarily happens through civil
societies, their educational programs, activists, storytelling programs, and even self-experience
or by being a witness of the harmful consequences of an old norm. The old norm is harmful and
there exist other norms that might be more consistent with their interests. The model begins
when those people may not yet possess a collective belief about which norm could be the best
substitute. At this point, Initial Violation plays a critical role in the path dependence embodied in
the theoretical model and can move the system in a new direction. The temporal point in which
norm contestation happens is significantly important because the old norm is still strong it might
reverse any progress toward a new norm or not even allow change due to negative feelings and
pressure by the society. Thus, to change or at least weaken the norm, Initial Violation must
happen at the point when it causes positive feelings among a sufficient population across society.
That positive feeling, with its roots in population values and norms, causes a perception of
similarity and moves the population from the old norm to a norm violators group. When this
occurs, civil societies play the main role educating people to learn and internalize the new norm.
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For the system to move toward the final event, a newly emerged norm, a significant number of
individuals in the violators population need to be socialized toward the new norm. At the same
time, only a very negligible percentage of the population continues to be educated toward the old
norm, thus perceiving dissimilarity and showing distrust toward the new norm. It is important to
mention that based on the results, lack of educational resources toward a new norm combined
with more government control and censorship, is one of the main reasons an average-strength
norm cannot be replaced in tight societies and an old norm must become weaker than average in
order to be replaced by a contesting norm. Violators who internalize the new norm begin to
behave based on it. This results in peer and government punishment—pressures which are
clearly higher in a tight society. however, government punishment does not always reduce the
risk taking. In cases when punishment is perceived to be illegitimate, it might trigger anger
among violators and increase risk taking and, in consequence, violating behavior, which hastens
the new norm emergence. Although this model is solely theoretical and not empirical, there exist
several successful historical, contemporary, and ongoing real-world examples that fit this model.
Real-World Applications of the Model
Several historical examples were discussed in earlier chapters. Now I would like to
explain some contemporary examples and applications of the model and norm emergence
through norm contestation. One of the major limitations of providing ongoing examples is that
we might only observe a part or some parts of the whole story and not all.
The Gilet Jaunes (Yellow Vest): France 2018-2019
The tax reform by President Macron intensified the economic struggle for the middle
class of the society and caused unemployment and economic misery for much of the working
class. Thus, the new law put pressure on the middle class and working-class groups.
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Coincidently, due to a cut in public transportation, most of the French population relied on their
own car for living. As a result, increasing the fuel price in France directly affected living
expenses and causing even greater economic disparities across different classes of French
society. This situation made many people angry and they asked for lower fuel prices and a few
other reforms to improve their life conditions and for more economic justice.
In October 2018, Eric Drouet and Priscilla Ludisky called on the people to contest the
law by blocking their local roads while using yellow jackets to attract attention to the issue
(Lichfield, 2019; Rubin & Sengupta, 2018). This movement had no association with any political
party and around 290,000 people participated in the contestation at the first call for action. The
number increased daily and calls for a second and third action gathered more and more people.
In the third call for action, on December 1, 2018, an elderly woman was killed by cops and later
that day a motorist was killed. The movement turned violent and civil unrest intensified. Based
on news reports, rioters took advantage of the unrest and attacked a nearby Apple store. Within a
month, the polls showed that the majority of the population agreed with the protestors. After four
weeks, contesters caused President Macron to change the law and increase the minimum wages.
The White Dress Does Not Cover the Rape: Lebanon 2016-2017
The Lebanese government, like several other governments, used to enforce the rapemarriage law. Called Article 522, if a rapist marries the victim there will be no punishment for
him. That article has faced several challenges and much opposition through time. It was amended
in 1940, but there was no further reform afterwards. In November 2016 a woman with many
bruises on her body wore a white dress and stood in front of the Lebanon parliament to show her
contestation and ask for the abolishment of Article 522. That contestation soon turned into public
protest. It got support from the Abaad MENA organization in December 2016 and several
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women wore white dresses with bandages around their eyes. That dress code implies that the
rape-marriage law is very discriminatory to women.
It should be noted that the Abaad MENA not only played a crucial role after the first
contestation to abolish that law, but also had a key role in bringing awareness and education of
the restrictive rape-marriage law to Lebanon’s population. Saad Hariri, the prime minister,
expressed his support for women’s rights soon after the beginning of the contestation. Finally,
people were able to get rid of the law in February 2017 when Article 522 was abolished in the
parliament.
In the broader context, and in the field of IR, the “marry the rapist law” used to be a
global law until late in the twentieth century when countries began to repeal it. Italy repealed it in
1981, Argentina in 2012, Ecuador in 2014, Jordan and Lebanon in 2017, and Palestine in 2018.
Based on a World Bank report there are only 12 countries in which this law is still in force,
primarily Middle Eastern and Asian countries. It is clear that the contagious transnational
movement will reach to those remaining countries, and they will abolish the law. However, this
is not possible without educating people in those countries. The results from the theoretical
model in this study emphasize that education is the most important factor to abolish a harmful
norm.
Contribution to the Extant Literature
There are several important contributions that this study makes to the field of political
science generally, and specifically to the norm study literature. This study expands the existing
theory in several areas.
The results from this work contribute theoretically to the constructivists’ actor-level norm
contestation theories. This study considered the possibility that powerless norm violators, in
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contrast to the huge and significant body of literature, can be norm promoters. Although in recent
years there has been a wave of attention given to studies of norm contestation by state actors and
powerful strong actors, there has been much less attention to powerless non-state actors in the
field. Thus, this research provides a unique theoretical contribution to constructivists’ norm
theory by advancing our understanding of the mechanism and dynamic process by which
powerless actors’ contestation occurs within a community and causes the emergence of new
norms that affect state behavior. This group of actors is generally ignored by most IR scholars.
In addition, this study added a new linkage to the norm study literature by considering the
reverse direction of causality. This research assumes that at an appropriate temporal point, the
norm violation could trigger positive feelings rather negative feelings, which is the dominant
belief in the field. In this case, violators encourage others to violate the norm for the sake of their
interests rather than solely being punished and abandoned by their peers. Moreover, this study
assumes that punishment can arguably intensify the violation rather being a prohibitor, based on
the literature. There are cases of when a government imposes an unjustified punishment, or the
punishment is too severe, and the citizen perception is of an inequality between the violation and
its punishment. In those cases, government punishment may make people angry. Angriness
increases risk taking and exceeds the fear of punishment at some point. Thus, in some instances,
rather than punishment being a prohibitor, it is a facilitator.
This study not only has some important theoretical contributions but indeed makes a unique
methodological contribution. The system dynamic modeling that I used to implement my
conceptual model provides insight about the causes and explanations for the overall pattern of
behavior. The norm study literature mostly focused on assessing and investigating from the
individual’s standpoint and the change in individuals’ norm behavior. System dynamics modeling,
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however, can find causes for norm emergence and individuals’ behavior by facilitating
understanding of the nonlinearities and the interactions of the different processes that come
together to cause the overall patterns of behavior. In the previous chapter, I discussed that
emergence of a new norm does have a nonlinear relation with initial violation and would not
emerge due to merely having the first violation happen. Rather, there are several other processes
that need to come together to fulfill the requirement for the emergence of a new norm. For example,
in the norm-antipreneur scenario I investigate how, when the existence of sufficient education
exists, the old norm can change the final outcome, even if the society encounters a first violation
at the appropriate temporal time.
Policy Recommendations
This study provides one interpretation of the mechanisms and necessary structural factors
that result in emergence of a new norm. In addition, I investigated some intervening events
during this dynamic process, which are summarized in Table 21. The simulation runs provide
some insightful results from which either government or contesters can benefit.
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Table 21. An Overview of Each Scenario and Its Impact on New Norm Population
Scenarios

Asymmetric Anger

Extreme

Behavior

Parameters

Initial Value

Feeling of Anger

Likelihood

of

0.7

Extreme

Policy

Behavior

Norm Antipreneur

Percentage of Dissimilarity

0.1

0.05

Scenarios

Change in New Norm

Values

Population

0

98.37 Percent Lower

0.4

56.61 Percent Lower

1

8.35 Percent Higher

0.01

11.47 Percent Higher

0.15

73.79 Percent Lower

0.15

32.19 Percent lower

One of the findings of this model is that there are contexts in which unjustified
government punishment results in anger which, in consequence, increases risk taking and
violation of norms. Based on the results from the asymmetric feeling of anger scenario,
governments potentially need to be cautious when it comes to punishing violators. If punishing
violators would be perceived as an illegitimate punishment, it could trigger feelings of anger and
could backfire. Feelings of anger which result in more violating behavior have another side
effect. They cause more people from outside of the group to notice the ongoing violation and,
due to emotional ties, they may then perceive similarity and join the violators group which
further weakens the old norm. Figure 79. illustrates these results.
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Figure 79. New Norm Population Change Under Asymmetric Feeling of Anger

Based on the results from the asymmetric feeling of anger scenario, governments need to
act carefully when punishing violators, so the punishment is not perceived as illegitimate. Thus,
governments usually seek a policy to justify their punishment and reduce the feelings of anger.
One policy that has been used by governments or third parties is Faux Activists. I represent this
with the Extreme Behavior variable in my model. The results from the model prove that more
extreme behavior, during the collective action step, can change the outcome significantly, as was
the case of our study in which the new norm population did not reach the tipping point in the
100-year time frame. In contrast, when the initial value for Likelihood of Extreme Behavior is
insignificant during the collective violation, the emergence of a new norm happens sooner in
comparison with the base run. This policy can also be used by the government to cover
unjustified punishment and suppress the collective action with an excuse. People who organize
the collective action must be cautious and act carefully to counter a faux activist policy as much
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as they can and reduce its impact. Figure 80. depicts the results from the model runs with
different values for Likelihood of Extreme Behavior.

Figure 80. New Norm Population Change Under Asymmetric Extreme Behavior

The simulation model results show that norm antipreneurs could be used as a tool for
governments to delay and/or prevent the emergence of a new norm. This group of agents are able
to postpone the tipping point to around year 95. This is a significant delay of when the tipping
point is reached and, indeed, the new norm population did not even equal half of the population
by the end of the 100-year time scale. Thus, just as educating toward a new norm is fundamental
for the emergence of a norm, educating toward an old norm can play an important but reverse
role, of which the government or any competing group can take advantage.
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Figure 81. New Norm Population Change Under Asymmetric Norm Antipreneurs

Limitation of the Model
Even with the contributions that this theoretical model makes to the existing body of
literature, the model presented in this study has some limitations and can be improved in some
ways by future work.
First, the parameter “Likelihood of Extreme Behavior” in this version has been modeled
as an exogenous constant variable. But it can be shown as a structure with more elaboration and
details in which this parameter arises from other factors in the model, and that would facilitate
study of more complex feedback loops.
Second, the flow rate “Stage 3. Percentage of Dissimilarity” right now represents the
change in the population that returns from the violators group population to the old norm
population. Arguably, this is too simple. The direction of this flow rate could be changed to
include a percentage of violators who perceive dissimilarity with the new norm. Instead of
returning to the old norm population they form another group of violators with a different goal.

172

Finally, ethical considerations of using the knowledge generated by this model can be
considered another limitation of the model. Making decisions and behaving based on ethical
values is not confined to personal domain—it also relates to the public realm including all
decision making at the national and sub-national levels. Thus, it is crucial for policy analysts,
senior advisers, or decision makers to provide knowledge and/or make policies that reflect the
ethical values and responsibilities. Many believe that the main ethical consideration for policy
makers is to choose a policy that aims to build a good society or to shift a society toward a better
one—in other words, bring justice to the society. With that in mind, and considering the nature
of this research, the model that is built in this research is a useful way to inform policy makers
about the different policies and their consequences, like implementing faux activism/extreme
behavior or enforcing more norm antipreneurs, but it poses its own drawbacks. Policy makers
can use the knowledge that is generated by the model in negative e ways and cause a delay in the
process of shifting a society toward a better one.
Areas for Future Work
During my investigation of different scenarios, I came up with some new insightful results
that inspire further research.
First, the simulation model’s results from the discursive-based weak norm scenario in a
non-democratic culture were particularly interesting. Based on the model’s results, the
contestation of harmful norms gathers enough followers to reach the tipping point. The question
for further research is, in non-democratic society, is it possible to change a norm when it is only
a discursive- based weak norm and not practice based?
The system dynamic models in this study enable me to understand the dynamic structure
and process that either a group of policy makers or contesters play, and the part each plays in the
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overall structure. It even enables the derivation of related policy for these groups to use.
However, a system dynamics model is less promising when it comes to investigating people’s
daily behavior under a contesting environment. An agent-based model would be better for
studying individual behaviors. Thus, building a multiparadigm model that combines both system
dynamics and agent-based modeling is another area for future study.
Finally, most of the initial values used in the model runs are derived from the literature
and are a scientific-study-based guess. Using more real-world data could enable optimization of
the model for particular norms and scenarios. This would provide better insight about different
conditions and policies. Thus, another area for future research would be to collect empirical data
with which to calibrate the model to fit particular instances or situations.
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